Soviet Naval Force Control and the Red naval C system: what the Blue commander needs to know by Tondu, Jennifer L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1989
Soviet Naval Force Control and the Red naval C
system: what the Blue commander needs to know
Tondu, Jennifer L.









SOVIET NAVAL FORCE CONTROL
AND THE RED NAVAL C^ SYSTEM:




Thesis Advisor: James G. Taylor




irity classification of this page
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Report Security Classification Lnclassified lb Restrict ive Markings
Security Classification Authority
Declassification Downgrading Schedule
3 Distribution Availability of Report
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Performing Organization Report Number(s) 5 Monitoring Organization Report Number(s)




7a Name of Monitoring Organization
Naval Postgraduate School
Address (city, state, and ZIP code)
onterev, CA 93943-5000
7b Address (city, state, and ZIP code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
Name of Funding Sponsoring Organization 8b Office Symbol
(if applicable)
9 Procurement Instrument Identification Number
Address (dry, state, and ZIP code) 10 Source of Funding Numbers
Program Element No Project No Task No Work Unit Accession N
Title (include security classification) SOVIET NAVAL FORCE CONTROL AND THE RED NAVAL C3 SYSTEM: WHAT
IE BLUE COMMANDER NEEDS TO KNOW
Personal Author(s) Jennifer L. Tondu








Supplementary Notation The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or po-
ion of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government,
Cosati Codes
Id Group Subgroup
IS Subject Terms (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Soviet Naval Force Control, naval C3 system, cybernetics
Abstract (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Soviet Naval Force Control is the process that the Soviets use to control naval forces during execution of assigned
issions, as well as create and maintain combat readiness and fightmg efficiency. It is the underlying basis of the Red naval
3 system; it provides control throughout a system composed of command posts, intelligence sensors, naval forces and
capons, and an interconnecting communications network. The concept of Soviet Naval Force Control and its support ol
e Red naval C3 system is discussed in this thesis. Emphasis is placed on how the Blue commander can use this information
enhance his decision making process concerning the utilization of his own C3 system. Major concepts examined in the
esis include Marxist-Leninist theory, Soviet military thought, cybernetics, and the Naval Force Control process. The as-
imption is made by the author that a Blue commander who is aware of and conversant with the major concepts presented
this thesis will have a better understanding of the Soviet approach to the C3 process and how it affects Soviet actions. In
rn. this understanding will increase his ability to control his own C3 system and successfully achieve his goal in battle out-
line.
Distribution Availability of Abstract
unclassified unlimited D same as report DTIC users
21 Abstract Security Classification
Unclassified
a Name of Responsible Individual
ones G. Tavlor




) FORM 1473,84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
security classification of this page
Unclassified
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Soviet Naval Force Control
and the Red Naval C3 System:
What the Blue Commander Needs To Know
by
Jennifer L. Tondu
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1982
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY





Soviet Naval Force Control is the process that the Soviets use to control naval
forces during execution of assigned missions, as well as create and maintain combat
readiness and fighting efficiency. It is the underlying basis of the Red naval C3 system;
it provides control throughout a system composed of command posts, intelligence sen-
sors, naval forces and weapons, and an interconnecting communications network. The
concept of Soviet Naval Force Control and its support of the Red naval C3 system is
discussed in this thesis. Emphasis is placed on how the Blue commander can use this
information to enhance his decision making process concerning the utilization of his own
C3 system. Major concepts examined in the thesis include Marxist-Leninist theory,
Soviet military thought, cybernetics, and the Naval Force Control process. The as-
sumption is made by the author that a Blue commander who is aware of and conversant
with the major concepts presented in this thesis will have a better understanding of the
Soviet approach to the C3 process and how it affects Soviet actions. In turn, this
understanding will increase his ability to control his own C3 system and successfully
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I. INTRODUCTION
Command and Control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly des-
ignated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
A Command and Control System consists of the facilities, equipment, communi-
cations, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing
and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned.
[Ref. 1 : p.74f
Americans view the effectiveness of a command, control and communication system
(C3), as defined above, to be a function of one's own capabilities, the enemy's capabili-
ties and the environment. The commander, with his C3 system, must comprehend his
own forces (mission, procedures, hardware, etc.), the enemy's forces, and the combat
environment in order to successfully achieve his goal in combat outcome.
In order to execute U.S. Maritime policy, commanders of U.S. Naval Forces must
be able to control their forces, i.e.. guide them to accomplish their assigned mission with
the help of a C3 system. Since engagement outcome not only depends on one's onw
forces and environmental conditions, but on the enemy (his forces, goals, capabilites,
operating procedures, etc.), a U.S. commander's effectiveness will be enhanced by his
knowledge of Soviet systems and actions, and his ability to exploit their weaknesses, in
particular weaknesses in command and control. The commander must be knowledgeable
in Soviet naval C3 capabilities. He must be aware of the Soviet battle management
process as well as Soviet hardware. However the Soviet concept of Command and
Control is, in many ways, different from the American concept of Command and Con-
trol.
Naval Force Control is the work of commanders, staffs, and other control elements
to maintain a high state of combat readiness of subordinate troops and to control
them in order to cam' out assigned missions. [Ref. 2 : p. 15]
Soviet Naval Force Control (Upravleniye Silami Flota) is the term used by the Soviet
military to reflect the concept of control of naval forces. The concept can be equated
to the term Troop Control {Upravleniye Voyskami) which refers to the control of ground
forces. The thesis will henceforth use the term Naval Force Control since the subject
matter pertains to control of naval forces.
Control not only pervades military affairs but saturates every facet of Soviet society.
It is vital to continued Soviet leadership by the Communist party. There is no explicit
term for "command" in Upravleniye Silami Flota. although the command function is not
ignored by the concept. However, emphasis is on the word "control".
Thus, for the Blue commander to be knowledgeable in Soviet naval C3 capabilities,
he must be familiar with Soviet Naval Force Control. He must understand that Soviet
Naval Force Control is the building block which the Soviet commander makes his deci-
sion on how to conduct C3.
What does the Blue commander gain by his recognition of Soviet Naval Force
Control? He gains the ability to better protect his own C3 system from enemy interfer-
ence. He acquires the aptitude to better neutralize, degrade, and or destroy enemy
forces. He understands the Soviet approach to the C3 process and how it affects Soviet
actions. As the theorist Sun Tzu stated, "Know the enemy and know yourself." [Ref. 3
:p.2]
Once the Blue commander is conscious of the concept of naval force control and its
application to the naval C3 system, he can now concentrate on the progression of the
Blue force C3 system. How can this be accomplished? One thought is the use of simu-
lated war games/trainers to test Blue force effectiveness against possible Soviet actions
as well as test Blue force initiatives in combat. In this case, there must be a working
knowledge of possible Soviet actions and reactions within the C3 arena in order to pro-
vide useful simulation and training.
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct an investigation of what knowledge the Blue
force naval commander needs concerning Soviet Naval Force Control and how it is ap-
plied to the Red naval C3 system, and thus, to the overall effectiveness of the Soviet
Navy. The Blue commander must be able to grasp the Soviet approach to conflict and
how this approach controls the use of their naval forces.
This thesis is organized into chapters. Each chapter is concluded by a chapter
summary. Chapter Two examines the driving principles behind control such as
Marxist-Leninist theory, Soviet military thought, and cybernetics. Chapter Three takes
a closer look at the Soviet control process. General concepts and management of naval
force control are discussed. Chapter Four pertains to the structure, missions and capa-
bilities of the Soviet Navy. Chapter Five discusses the Red naval C3 system; the com-
mand posts, communications and intelligence links, which, when bonded with forces and
weaponry, comprise the C3 system. Chapter Six presents an overview of the concepts
reviewed in the previous chapters and provides recommendations for enhancing the ef-
fectiveness of the Blue naval C3 system.
II. FOUNDATION FOR UNDERSTANDING NAVAL FORCE CONTROL
A. INTRODUCTION
The Blue commander must comprehend that control is vital in all aspects of Soviet
life and a standard of Soviet leadership. To understand this concept, it is necessary to
first examine the driving principles and theories behind control. These principles include
Marxist- Leninist theory, Soviet military thought, the effects of past war experience and
the revolution in military affairs on military thought, and cybernetics. This chapter
presents each principle to the reader. In conclusion, the information is summarized with
the intent of explaining how the Blue commander can use this knowledge to increase the
effectiveness of his decision making process for employing his C3 system.
B. MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY
Marxist-Leninist philosophy is simultaneously the science of laws governing the
development of nature, society and thought and the world outlook of the working
class, affirming communist ideals and moral principles. In it, elucidation of truth
and defense of class interests do not exclude but. on the contrary, necessarily imply
each other. That is why the Marxist-Leninist philosophy is an instrument for the
revolutionary remaking of society and a method of scientifically examining social
phenomena which helps find the correct path towards the historical goals of the
working class. [Ref. 4 : p. 57]
To understand Soviet Naval Force Control, one must understand the Soviet military
mindset. The roots of this mindset are imbedded in Marxist-Leninist theory.
Marxism-Leninism is thought of as scientific theory by the Soviets. Science encom-
passes the beliefs that laws governing the evolution of the world, as composed of nature
and society, exist and that these laws can be revealed by man, thus giving him the means
of controlling nature and society. Science allows Soviets to impose order on the world.
Hence, the Soviets insist upon all policies and decisions being scientifically substantiated.
[Ref. 5 : p. 42] Marxist-Leninist theory is founded on the philosophical base of
dialectical and historical materialism. Dialectical and historical materialism "... is a
philosophical world outlook that fulfills the functions of a theory of cognition, serves
as a universal method of cognition and practical action." [Ref. 6 : p. 292]
To examine dialectical and historical materialism, one must begin by unveiling the
Marxian theory of materialism. Karl Marx believed that matter existed independently
of, and prior to, ideas; and that ideas were simply an embodiment of matter. [Ref. 7 :
p. 30] In other words, the world exists independently of man's senses. Marxist theory
further states that reality is material; everything that exists and all events that take place
are products of matter. [Ref. 8 : p. 6]
Marx's dialectic nature of materialism is focused on three steps described as the
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; a process which, in the past, has been discerned as a
development of thought or logic. Essentially, a statement is made (thesis) and then, by
a process of examination, another statement is made which contradicts the first state-
ment (antithesis). A third statement which merges the first statement and its contra-
diction brings the process to a conclusion (synthesis). The synthesis then becomes a new
thesis and the process continues. [Ref. 7 : p. 34]
Dialectic materialism is further explained by the three laws governing dialectics.
These laws are based on the philosophy that everything is always changing and always
moving. [Ref. 4 : p. 157]
The first law is the transformation of quantity into quality. Quantity is described
in philosophy as aspects of an object which become rearranged, increased or decreased,
while the object maintains its identity. Quality is defined as the disappearance of the
old object and the appearance of a new object. The law of transition of quantity into
quality represents a gradual buildup of changes which leads to the disappearance of the
old and a qualitative change. [Ref. 4 : p. 163]
The second law is the law of the unity and conflict of opposites.
The source of any object's movement lies in the interaction (conflict) of opposites
which are inherent in it. Therefore, movement is self-movement. Opposites can
attain only partial, relative equilibrium, and that only for a time; they can never be
balanced completely. The disparity, the contradiction between them is always
present in varying degrees, being as indestructable as motion itself. The unity, the
equal effect of opposites, is temporary and relative, whereas their conflict is eternal
and absolute. [Ref. 4 : p. 183]
In essence, as described in the above quote, motion, development, and progress are
seen as the result of a struggle or conflict of opposites which continues eternally.
The third law, negation of the negation implies a succession of stages of develop-
ment in which each stage disappears with time, being negated by each following stage,
and so on. The succession of developmental stages is viewed as progressive. [Ref. 4 :
p. 175]
Dialectical materialism provides the structure for the application of Marxist history,
better known as historical materialism or economic determinism. Historical materialism
views history as an endless series of class struggles between the oppressor and the op-
pressed, the exploiter and the exploited. This continuous conflict will only end when the
highest "communist" stage, the era of the classless society, is attained. This can only be
reached through revolution. [Ref. 9 : p. 41]
Marx explains this philosophy within the premise that economic forces have deter-
mined the passage of history; economic forces being the modes of production which de-
termine the entire composition of society. Modes of production include the systems of
law, politics, morals, religion, philosophy, and art--the whole way of life or culture. [Ref.
7 : pp. 64-65] Corresponding to the modes of production are the relations of production,
which mainly concern the form of ownership; ownership of tools and other means of
production. Moreover, in Marxian usage, relations of production is synonymous with
the term "class struggle". [Ref. 8 : p. 19] Marx believed that history was based on con-
tinuing stages of class struggles. Progression from one stage to another would evolve
through revolution. "Revolutions occur when the 'alienated' or 'exploited' class becomes
politically conscious of its exploitation and acts to destroy the social and economic sys-
tem, creating a new economic order." [Ref. 10 : p. 1-1] At some point, class struggle
would become unbearable, and the last and greatest class struggle would take place in
the form of revolutionary overthrow of the ruling class by the proletariat. [Ref. 7 : p.
65], followed by the synthesis of a communist society.
Thus the Marxist outlook on history focuses on economic factors, chiefly private
property, as the basic origin of war. As long as capitalism exists, war is unavoidable.
The Soviets systematize war into two major categories-just and unjust wars. "Any
war that is waged by a people for the sake of freedom and social progress, for liberation
from its state sovereignty, against an attack is a just war." [Ref. 6 : p. 63] Therefore, a
war is just if it disrupts capitalism. Conversely, unjust wars are wars that harm the
forces of socialism. Just and unjust wars are subcategorized into the following:
1. wars between opposing social systems;
2. civil wars between socialists and capitalists;
3. wars between colonialists and the peoples fighting for their independence; and
4. wars between capitalist states. [Ref. 6 : p. 70]
Marxist- Leninist theory provides a modus operandi for justifying the use of struggle,
conflict and revolution to destroy the oppressors of society in order for the oppressed
to survive. It allows the Soviet people a moral mission of eradicating reactionary forces,
or any group which threatens the socialist camp, in the pursuit of worldwide
Communism. It concedes to Soviet leadership an ideological doctrine that serves as the
foundation of the Soviet state. The Communist Party has been kept in power to the
present day by the Armed Forces. Soviet forces are immersed in the teaching of
Marxism- Leninism [Ref. 5 : p. 32] , thus ensuring the power of the CPSU to continue
its conflicts against all non-socialist states with the backing of the people and the Armed
Forces of the Soviet Union.
C. SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT
Before discussing Soviet military thought, it is important to comprehend that the
Soviets use the systems approach when developing and revising military thought proc-
esses. What is the systems approach?
In complex systems, behavior of system elements must be explained in terms of
interrelationships among the elements themselves as well as with the environment. The
systems approach is a method of thinking; a philosophy which considers a complex
system (project, process, problem) as a whole. "Because of the mutual interaction of the
parts, the whole takes on distinctive properties that would be lacking were one to remove
a part." [Ref. 1 1 : p. 7] This approach is in contrast to the more widely known analytical
approach, in which a system is broken down into its individual properties and analyzed
separately.
A system is described as a set of elements and element attributes of which relation-
ships exist between the elements, their attributes, and the environment. The system
must achieve some goal. There are five basic considerations concerning systems think-
ing.
1. Objectives of the total system together with performance measures. The objectives
are the goals of the system. These goals should be quantifiable.
2. The system's environment. The environment comprises everything that is outside
the system's control and that affects system performance.
3. The resources of the system Resources are the means that the system uses to reach
its objectives. Resources are usually inside the system.
4. The components of the system. Components are all the activities that must be
performed in order for the system to attain its objectives.
5. The management of the system. Management pertains to the planning and con-
trolling of the system. [Ref. 11 : p. 29]
The Soviets apply the systems approach to formulating the conceptual basis of
Soviet military thought. Specialized systems theories such as cybernetics and operations
research are particularly important to Soviet Naval Force Control.
As discussed in the previous section, the Soviets view history as a process of strug-
gles. These struggles often lead to war, i.e., armed conflict. The Soviets regard war as
a predicament which must be planned for with the expectation of victory. Dialectical
logic and historical materialism permit the Soviets to embody "...military power and its
use into their policy for achieving national objectives." [Ref. 5 : p. 51] Hence, the Soviets
have used a very scientific approach to the study of war. They endeavor to uncover its
operating principles and, once understanding these laws, develop methods of operation
which assure Soviet victory in all types of armed conflict. [Ref. 10 : p. 2-1] Soviet mili-
tary thought is part of a strict and refined framework which provides backbone concepts,
definitions and laws developed and maintained by the highest Soviet political and mili-
tary leaders with the goal of achieving that victory.
Soviet military thought is comprised of a hierarchy of concepts and terms; military
doctrine (VOENNAYa DOKTRINA). military science (VOENNAYa NAUKA), and
the most important element of military science, military art (VOEWOE ISKL'SSTVO).
See Figure 1 on page 9 for a diagram of the hierarchy.
D. MILITARY DOCTRINE
The Soviet Military Encyclopedia defines military doctrine.
A system of views adopted in a state for a given period of time on the objectives and
character of a possible war. on preparation of the country and armed forces for war,
and on methods of waging the war. Military doctrine usually determines the enemy
who will have to be fought in a possible war: the character and objectives of a war
in which a state and its armed forces will have to participate, and their missions;
what armed forces are needed for sucessful conduct of a war and the directions in
their development; procedures for preparing the country for war; and methods for
waging war. The basic provisions of military doctrine are determined by the socio-
political and economic system, level of production, status of the means for waging
war, and the geographical position of one's own and the probable enemy's country;
and they also stem from a state's domestic and foreign policy. [Ref. 12 : p. 213]
Military doctrine differentiates two interrelated aspects; political and military-
technical. The political aspect is comprised of the political goals of a war and how those
goals result in the armed forces and the country's preparation for that war. The
military-technical aspect, in its attempt to achieve the political goals, is concerned with
warfighting methods and development, and emphasizes weapon technology and com-
mand competence.
The CPSU is the source of all approved military doctrine. Doctrinal views must be
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Figure 1. Hierarchy of Soviet Military Thought
Communist Party leaders. Military doctrine is developed by high-level Party members
and approved by the Party's Central Committee. [Ref. 10 : p. 2-3]
Soviet doctrinal beliefs result in requirements for the country and its armed forces;
requirements that transform doctrinal thought into action. Superior Soviet military ca-
pability must be assured in order for the country to be ready to wage war and meet its
political objective of victory'. Hence, the Soviets place great emphasis on preparation for
war. The laws of war state that war can be prepared for by:
• insuring the Soviet Union has superior forces at the start of war,
• insuring that the potential war capabilities of the homefront are always maximized
for the support of war,
• insuring that the Communist Party maintains complete control, and
• insuring the Soviet people express views consistent with Party political and military
policies. [Ref. 10 : p. 2-4]
Military doctrine is not static. The state explicitly revises the doctrine as needed. The
state may either improve the existing doctrine or completely replace it with a new doc-
trine. Current Soviet military doctrine is oriented toward waging war with a
diametrically opposed social system in which capitalism would succumb to socialism.
War may involve the use of nuclear weapons. While war initially could be conventional,
the losing side inevitably would resort to tactical and strategic weapons in an effort to
avoid complete defeat. Final victory would hinge on joint actions of all arms of the
services. In scope, war would unavoidably become intercontinental, since both sides
possess long-range missiles, nuclear missile-carrying submarines, and strategic bonbers.
The first massive nuclear strikes would determine the subsequent course of the war. [Ref.
13 : p. 4-2]
The Soviet country and the Soviet armed forces are preparing for victory in a nu-
clear war. Soviet military doctrine follows the assumption that the imperialists are
planning a surprise nuclear attack against the USSR and other socialist countries, or
that a conventional war could escalate into military operations involving the use of nu-
clear weapons. Thus. Soviet armed forces must constantly be prepared to repel such
attacks. [Ref. 6 : p. 305]
E. MILITARY SCIENCE
A leading requirement of Soviet military doctrine is that it be scientifically substan-
tiated. Military science sustains the scientific foundation of the CPSU's military policies.
Military science is the system of knowledge dealing with the nature and laws of war,
the preparation of the armed forces and the country for war. and the methods for
waging war. Military science, together with other sciences, studies war as a complex
socio-political phenomenon. Military science data are used in developing military
doctrine. [Ref. 12 : p. 23S]
Another definition states
Military science investigates the objective laws governing armed conflict and elabo-
rates questions pertaining to the theory of military art which is the basic component
of military science, as well as questions pertaining to the organization, training, and
supplv of armed forces, and also deals with military historical experience. [Ref. 10 :
p. 2-4]
A more utilitarian interpetation is
Military science examines all military affiars, past, present and future and then
works out the most current methods of waging war. [Ref. 10 : p. 2-4]
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Major components of military science include the theories of military art, military
construction, military instruction and indoctrination, and military economics and rear
services. [Ref. 12 : p. 238] The goal of military science is to reveal the general laws of
war and the laws of armed conflict.
The Soviets make a distinction between the terms "armed conflict" and "war".
Armed conflict deals with the struggle on the battleground and is managed by military
commanders. War is a broader vision of armed conflict; war embraces the economic,
political, ideological and technical aspects of struggle in addition to the struggle on the
battleground. War is managed by the political leadership of the Soviet Union. [Ref. 10
: p. 2-5]
1 . General Laws of War
Marxist-Leninist teaching and the experience of past wars are the basis for
Soviet military science. Marxist-Leninist teachings proved that war is not a random
chaotic process of accidents, but a process governed by laws. [Ref. 6 : p. 310] The
Marxist view of history interprets historical development as guided by class struggle and
revolution. The Soviets have pivoted their laws ofwar on historical change and progress
and critical review of past war experience and policies. These laws are used in even'
component of military science, including the theory of Soviet Naval Force Control. The
general laws of war and simple interpretations of these laws are listed below.
• The course and outcome of war waged with unlimited employment of all means of
conflict depend primarily on the correlation of available, strictly military forces of
the combatants at the begining of the war. [Ref. 10 : p. 1-11]
The first law implies that Soviet forces must be ready at the beginning of war
in order to be decisive in the outcome. "The large Soviet force structure today, therefore,
finds a clear military scientific justification in this first law of war." [Ref. 10 : p. 1-11]
Modern nuclear war places even more emphasis on this law since the Soviets believe that
the first massive strike will determine the course of the war. Thus, forces ready at the
onset will be the determinants of the outcome.
• The course and outcome of war depend on the correlation of military potentials
of combatants. [Ref. 10 : p. 1-11]
The second law implies that the consequence of war will be subject to the
mobilization potential of the Soviet Union (the industrial base and the work force, the
scientific and research base, the organizational mechanism for turning civilian resources
to military use, etc.). [Ref. 10 : p. 1-12]
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• fhe course and outcome of a war depends on its political context. [Ref. 10 : p.
1-11
P cf.ucal context concerns entering a just war at the right time and on the right
..-
..; strengthen the Soviet armed forces' conviction of the righteous:.
-
of the a: Re:" 1- : p. 20j Assessment of the political makeup of Soviet forces must
also re made For example. Soviet troops from national minority groups are
conspirators :f incensing anti-Soviet sentiments. Therefore, these groups are spread
throughout Soviet forces to dilute any political aggregation of such sentiments. [Ref. 10
: p. 1-12]
• 7 .-.-; course and outcome :f a war depend on the correlation of moral-political and
rso .v.: ;:.:.:. carabthties of the peoples and armies of the combatants Ref i0 :
" 11]
'
The fourth implies that prcper psychological preparation of one's own
forces is necessar tc ensure survival and functional abilities of the Soviet people and
armed forces Technical infc rm ati Dn about nuclear weapons, including the effects :;.
protect :: :.:. ..:..-: . : aecontamination from nuclear bursts, are part of the Soviet
people s political indoctrination Ref 1- p 21] Propagand a about the "unjust _ po-
:n ofthe opponent s actions and lifestyle can also re usee to exploit national feelings.
1-
.
. . p ! - 1
1
- has of Armed Conf. -
:
fhe
• ; armed comuct are derived from the general laws ofwar and describe
-
nes and relations of armed conflict Tne basic laws ofarmed conflict include




- arc' metiiocls ; ... : armec cor act on the *
pens an: combat and special equipment
'- £ effect . ;-; :f the combat actions of troops or the - re-
:crms arc methods of the actions to the goals tasks and situ-
—rse anc outcome cf armed cermet on the .
pmert ; the stdes the moral .mo political and psychc-
the k : afprerararcr of commands staff and troors
tors [Ref 15 p 22]
.resc .a ; arc sr-cc





> a_so p.uce great emphasts on eqi • c there sa c rement for
oeth more and better f; ' . p ;..-
Military science and its laws of war and armed conflict are not complete or
static. Military- science was shaped and developed through past historic periods and
continues its evolvement through ongoing scientific-technical progress. The develop-
ment of military science is used "...in increasing the combat might and readiness of the
Soviet armed forces, in reinforcing the defensive might of the USSR and the other
countries of the socialist commonwealth, and in creating favorable conditions for the
successful development of socialism and communism." [Ref. 12 : p. 248] Military sci-
ence is continually growing, under the leadership of the CPSU in order to fulfill the re-
sponsibility of defending and strengthening the Soviet Union.
F. MILITARY ART
Military art is the major component of military science and is defined as the theory
and practice for preparing for and conducting military operations. [Ref. 12 : p. 192.] The
principles of military art determine the direction taken by the actions of the leadership,
and show what action should be taken to achieve victory. [Ref. 6 : p. 321] Military art
is composed of three integral levels; military strategy, operational art, and tactics.
1. Military Strategy
Military strategy is based on the tenets of military doctrine, past war experience,
and the current political, economic and military conditions of the situation.
At the same time, military strategy is a field of practical activity for the higher mili-
tary command in training the armed forces for war and providing leadership in
armed conflict. Military strategy exerts an influence on the preparation of a country
for war in such a way as to ensure victory. [Ref. 10 : p. 2-7]
Military strategy is the highest level of military art. It develops theoretical bases for
planning, preparing and conducting war and strategic operations.
There are two aspects of strategy; the theoretical aspect and the applied aspect.
The theoretical aspect includes principles of strategy and addresses the theoretical basis
for war plan development. The applied aspect consists of actual war plan development.
[Ref. 9 : p. 81]
2. Operational Art
The theory of operational art develops principles and methods for preparing and
conducting joint and independent operations and combat actions by operational
formation of the services of the armed forces.
Operational art is the bonding link between strategy and tactics. It is derived
from strategic requirements with the intent of achieving strategic goals through effective
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use of resources readily available. The plans developed from operational art serve as
initial data input for tactical operations. Thus, operational art is concerned with combat
development at the theater level. [Ref. 10 : p. 2-10]
3. Tactics
The theory of tactics is concerned with preparing and conducting combat by
formations, units, and subunits. Military tactics holds a subordinate position with re-
spect to strategy and operational art by acting in their interests and serving to achieve
the goals developed by operational art. Each service of the armed forces has its own
tactics which are called service tactics. [Ref. 5 : p. 64]
The theoretical aspects of tactics are found in field manuals, training manuals,
textbooks, etc. The practical aspects of tactics are ascertained "...in innovative applica-
tion of its theoretical points and principles by commanders, staffs and troops when or-
ganizing and conducting combat operations on a tactical scale with the aim of executing
assigned missions." [Ref. 10: p. 2-12]
G. SOVIET THEORY OF THE NAVY
Naval theory must be considered within the overall structure of Soviet military
thought. The theory of the Navy is a system of scientific knowledge which reveals laws
and principles of naval warfare, naval organizational development, and naval prepara-
tion and employment in the armed forces system during times of war and peace. [Ref.
16 : p. 25] The theory of the Navy is based on, and consequently subordinate to military
science. It uses the general laws of war and the subsequent laws of armed conflict.
The theory of the Navy consists of interrelated branches which include general the-
ory, naval art, theories of organizational development of the Navy, military training and
indoctrination of personnel, command and control of the Navy, naval rear services, and
naval history, as well as sciences that deal with the ocean environment. The theory of
the Navy is not a set of individual components but a coordinated system of knowledge.
[Ref. 16 : p. 31]
One important feature of the theory of the Navy is that it pays strict attention to
developing joint actions with other services of the armed forces. [Ref. 16 : p. 28] Joint
actions are a fundamental principle within the Soviet military. The Soviets believe that
a coordinated effort by all branches of the armed forces is necessary for victory to be
realized. Thus, the theory of the Navy is developed to interact with other service theo-
ries. [Ref. 14 : p. 25]
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Naval art is considered the most important branch of the theory of the Navy. Naval
art represents a system of scientific knowledge consisting of laws and principles of naval
warfare and the theory and practice of preparing and conducting operations, combat
actions, battles, and engagements. It is based on the principles of military art. Struc-
turally, naval art consists of the theory of strategic employment of the Navy, the theory
of operational art of the Navy, and tactics of the Navy. [Ref 16 : p. 33]
The theory of strategic employment of the Navy is based on the principles of mili-
tary strategy. "It examines questions of the Navy's employment in attempting to attain
the primary objectives of armed conflict in ocean areas, and in those coastal sectors of
continental theaters where strategic missions are accomplished with the Navy's partic-
ipation." [Ref. 14 : p. 27]
Operational art of the Navy pertains to the theory and practice of preparing and
conducting combat operations by naval formations. Specific naval features are studied
which affect the development of the physical means of fighting in the ocean, operational
employment and general naval missions. Guidance for development with other services
is also studied. [Ref. 14 : p. 27]
Naval tactics encompasses the theory and practice of preparing and conducting na-
val combat actions. Tactics is a more independent field of naval art due to the variations
of tactics that exist in determining its relationship with naval equipment, the sea envi-
ronment, naval missions, naval actions, and weapon employment. [Ref. 16 : p. 34]
H. PAST WARS AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
In reviewing the concepts of Soviet military thought, it is quite apparent that past
war experiences have played a major role in its development. The Soviets strongly be-
lieve an in-depth examination of military history will steer them away from the danger
of repeating errors of the past and aid in disclosing antiquated theories. Thus, all doc-
trinal and organizational development, as well as weapon technology, are scrutinized
against military historical experience. [Ref. 17 : p. 11]
The Soviets view their participation in World War II from 1941-1945, an event they
call the Great Patriotic War, as an invaluable depositor}" of war experience. The study
of this war has greatly influenced the development of all aspects of military science, in-
cluding Naval Force Control. [Ref. 15 : p. 3] Most major Soviet military theoretical
works on military science reference lessons learned from the Great Patriotic War, at-
tempting to teach the art of war as well as instill patriotism for the Soviet state and
provide justification of the defense budget. [Ref. 11 : p. 78] It is also important to re-
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member that the Great Patriotic War was the last major conflict that the Soviets have
participated in.
The Great Patriotic War has been the subject of thousands of books, pamphlets and
articles. Soviet versions of the war portray the defeat of Hitler as due primarily to the
wise and courageous leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Ref. 11 :
p. 73], thus ensuring the CPSU as the guiding force of the state.
The postwar period brought about the "revolution in military affairs", a term
adopted to explain changes in the Soviet armed forces' view on warfare that resulted
from the production of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. [Ref. 18 : p. 47] It pro-
vided a major shift in the fundamental concepts of Soviet military thought. The revo-
lution in military affairs is composed of three phases:
1. the development of nuclear weapons,
2. the development of long-range missiles to deliver these nuclear weapons, and
3. the development of comprehensive automation of the forces and means for waging
such war. [Ref. 19 : p. 15]
The first two phases occurred in the 1950s. From 1953 to 1959, the establishment
of strategic nuclear weapons and the rapid development of missile technology led to
radical changes which resulted in combat operations designed to contend with a nuclear
environment. [Ref. 17 : p. 12] Military doctrine reflected that the might of a nation was
based on the amount and types of nuclear weapons and the means of delivery. [Ref. 1
1
: p. 159] By the late 1960's, the assumption was made that a non-nuclear war was pos-
sible. Therefore, although nuclear weapons retained their primary status, the role o[
conventional weapons was increased. [Ref. 11 : p. 211]
The third phase began in the 1970's. The need to generalize and evaluate a large
flow of incoming information in short periods of time as well as react to abrupt and
rapid situational changes led to automation of the most labor-intensive processes. [Ref.
15 : p. 5] New and developing technology allowed automation to be integrated into a
broad range of weapon systems "...as well as into the command and control network
extending into the operational tactical headquarters in the field." [Ref. 17 : p. 13] The
revolution in military affairs essentially began in the strategic arena and concurrently
changed the operational and tactical arena as well.
I. SOVIET CYBERNETICS
KIBERNETIKA (Cybernetics) is the science concerning the laws of control, com-
munications, and transmitting information. The basic objects of investigation by
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cybernetics are the control processes in technical, biological, administrative, social,
and other systems. The following theories constitute the scientific basis for
cybernetics: probability, operations research, information, algorithms, automatic
control, pattern recognition, and others. The technological basis for cybernetics is
general-purpose and special-purpose electronic computers and equipment. Exper-
imental, mathematical-analytical methods and the method of mathematical model-
ling are used in cybernetics. A series of independent scientific directions have been
singled out in contemporary cybernetics, including military cybernetics, technical
cybernetics, economic cybernetics, biological cybernetics, medical cybernetics, and
others, (as translated from the Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary in [Ref 2 : p.
69]
Soviet cybernetics is the science which studies control in machines, living systems,
and social processes. A control process consists of three elements: the object of control,
the controlling device or control organ, and the communications channels between them.
These elements combine to form a cyclical process which progresses to achieve an ex-
plicit goal. [Ref. 20 : p. 11]
The direct communications path transmits commands or controlling actions from
the control organ to the object of control as well as status information through the
feedback channel which leads back to the control organ. The generation of the con-
trolling actions stems from comparing status information corresponding to the achieve-
ment of the goal with the present status. Thus, information plays a large role in a
control process. [Ref. 20 : p. 12] See Figure 2 on page 18 for a simple paradigm of a
cybernetic process.
A single control loop consists of one line of direct communications and one line of
feedback. In reality, control processes usually require the interaction of several inter-
connected loops. Therefore, cybernetics is concerned with control processes occurring
in complex dynamic systems that consist of large numbers of interconnected elements
and subsystems which are in a state of motion, change or development. [Ref. 20 : p. 22]
For example, a naval fleet can be looked at as a dynamic system. Its subsystem will be
the battle groups, which in turn, consist of units and ships. The control organ is re-
presented by fleet headquarters. This multilevel structure will have a very complicated
communications system. The entire system is a characteristic cybernetic system. [Ref.
20: p. 31]
The field of applied cybernetics which studies control of forces and means in military
affairs is called military cybernetics. A more precise definition follows:
VOENNAYa KIBERNETIKA (military cybernetics) studies the general law-
governed patterns of the control of troops and combat means on the basis of com-
mon cybernetic concepts. It is the theoretical basis for automation of control of
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Figure 2. Simple Paradigm of a Cybernetic Process
troops (forces) and combat means. Military cybernetics started to develop at the
end of the 1950's on the basis of the achievements of general cybernetics and mili-
tary science. It has worked out a unified theory for controlling the armed forces
with the use of automated systems of control (ASL'). The theoretical basis of mili-
tary cybernetics consists of the theories of military art, operations research, auto-
mated control, algorithms for military problems, and information. It is closely
connected with other sciences. It is widely used in the work of commanders and
stalls at all stages of troop control and for the creation of information systems, the
improvement of armaments, and the preparation of the military cadre, (as translated
from the Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary in [Ref. 2 : pp. 60-61]
Soviet military cybernetics looks at the important questions of control of forces and
equipment during preparation and performance of combat actions, as well as problems
concerning the automation of control. It is the theoretical basis for automating and
mechanizing naval force control. Its basic areas consist of information theory which
involves transmittal of messages over communications channels; the theory of algo-
rithms which studies the rules of information processing; and the theory of control de-
vices which involves the design and operation of machines and mechanisms used for
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automated information processing and the interaction between man and machine. [Ref.
21 : p. 175.] It uses the same cyclical process described above. See Figure 3 on page 20
for a diagram of a military cybernetic process.





• the law of completion from without. [Ref. 19 : p. 68]
The definition of complexity can vary depending on the viewpoint. However, this
thesis will interpret complexity as the quality or property of a system which is the com-
bined interaction of four determinants. These determinants are :
1. the number of elements in the system,
2. the attributes of the elements in the system,
3. the number of interactions between the elements in the system, and
4. the degree of organization inherent in the system. [Ref. 22 : p. 90]
The Soviets consider both individual weapon systems and also combat units to be com-
plex systems. [Ref. 19 : p. S]
The more complex a system, the more difficult it is to understand and control it, as
well as define its interrelationships and predict its behavior. As the number of elements
in a system increases, the number of interrelationships increase, and the amount of un-
certainty grows. The system is said to possess more variety than it did initially. Infor-
mation can diminish variety, not because it simplifies the system, but because it makes
the system more predictable. [Ref. 22 : p. 87] The law of requisite variety states that in
order to control a complex sytem, the amount of variety in the control system must
possess more variety than the system that it controls. [Ref. 19 : p. 69] The Soviets believe
that if they command greater variety in their forces than the enemy has, and provide the
skilled commanders who can utilize this variety, then they are on course to achieving
victor}" in combat. [Ref. 19 : p. 70]
The cyclical process described previously uses a feedback channel to transfer status
information to the control organ. Feedback aids in maintaining a prescribed relation-
ship. An output of a controlled system is returned as an input. This input is measured























Figure 3. Basic Paradigm of a Military Cybernetic Process
predetermined level, controlling actions must be transmitted to the controlled system to
correct the deviation. [Ref. 5 : p. 75] Thus, feedback is the key to controlling a system.
Information can be routed back to the commander, or even a computer, to assess the
results of actions taken, and if necessary, correct those actions.
The law of completion from without concerns using human reasoning to join ap-
propriate formal control procedures with actual situations. The Soviets have put forth
a great effort to match formal control procedures with real-world situations, not with the
intent of telling the commander what to do but to provide him an incomplete input to
the control process that must be completed by human judgement. [Ref. 19 : p. 71]
J. CONTEXT
There is one final factor that the Blue commander must be made aware of because
it may affect his ability to apply this information to his naval C3 system. This factor is
known as context.
Soviet military concepts are not readily understood in the West, mainly because of
inadequate Western translations of the material. Most Soviet open-literature writings
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have not been translated and many of the translations that have been done are either
inaccurate or inconsistent. [Ref. 19 : p. 8] Context, the knowledge of a subject area in
light of its source language and culture, is defined as consisting of three elements:
1. a vocabulary of the subject area in the source language,
2. a conceptual framework of the subject area in the source language (understanding
the grammar with respect to the vocabulary), and
3. a perspective on how the vocabulary and conceptual framework relate to the sub-
ject area. [Ref. 5 : p. 16]
Context is highly important because of American linguistic deficiencies. Many
Soviet military concepts are misunderstood by the West due to inadequate English
translations of Soviet Russian language writings. In order to correctlv translate Soviet
writings, a translator must not onlv be fluent in the Russian lansuasze, he must under-
stand Soviet military concepts and possess knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory. The
translator should, perhaps, be qualified as an "translator-analyst" of the particular topic
to be translated. [Ref. 19 : p. 74] As the translator becomes more aware of context, the
inadequacies in Western translations of Soviet writings should decrease.
K. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Chapter Two has been concerned with reviewing fundamental principles which are
necessary for understanding the concept of Soviet Naval Force Control. Without
knowledge of these principles, the Blue commander would lose essential insights into
Soviet Naval Force Control and how it is applied to the Soviet Red naval C3 system.
In summary, these principles are Marxist-Leninist theory, Soviet military thought, past
war experience and the revolution in military affairs, cybernetics, and context.
Marxist-Leninist theory is particularly important if one is trying to understand
Soviet military writings. It provides the scientific basis for control. The Soviets believe
that one must know dialectical and historical materialism to control any object or
process. Thus, should not the Blue commander understand these principles as well?
Soviet military thought envelopes concepts and laws that have been developed and
maintained by the highest Soviet leaders. It is comprised of military doctrine (war is
political and can be used by the state as a tool in order to achieve its political goals),
military science (theory and conduct of armed warfare), and military art (applying mili-
tary doctrine and military science to the actual forms and means of combat). An
understanding of military thought becomes extremely important when viewed as the
premise and basis for the operational aspects of the Soviet Navy.
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Past war experience and the revolution in military affairs has been studied, extended
and formalized to contribute to doctrinal and organizational development. The experi-
ences of the Great Patriotic War have been examined at considerable extent since it was
the last large-scale conflict in which the Soviets have been involved. Lessons learned
from the Great Patriotic War instill remembrance of the sacrifices and destruction
wrought against the Soviet people and infuse patriotism as well as vindication of enor-
mous military expenditures. The advent of nuclear weapons and its aftermath have led
to influential changes in Soviet military affairs.
Cybernetics is the science of control. The Soviets apply cybernetics to optimize
control. The most important facet of Soviet cybernetics is that the Soviets have devel-
oped cybernetics into an enveloping science that not only applies to mechanical systems,
but to social processes as well. Cybernetics has given the Red commander the tools to
control his forces and equipment. Control is not a new concept to him. Control is part
of his lifestyle, emanating from the heights of Communist Party leadership.
How can the Blue commander use the above acquired knowledge to make better
informed decisions and thereby more effectively command his assigned tactical units?
Of foremost importance is the fact that the Blue commander has a better perception of
the Soviet commander's mindset. To transfer this perception to the Blue naval C3 sys-
tem, battle group stalls, combined warfare commanders, COs, XOs, tactical action offi-
cers, department heads and all other key personnel comprising and supporting the
system must also have a basic perception of the Soviet mindset. To render this percep-
tion, indoctrination and education in the fundamental principles discussed above is nec-
essary. With this knowledge, the Blue naval command structure will better comprehend
the backbone of Soviet Naval Force Control and the Soviet approach to conflict.
The need for qualified translator-analysts to translate Soviet Russian military
writings is also imperative to ensure that the Blue commander, his staff and subordinate
forces correctly understand Soviet military concepts. It is necessary to assess one's op-
ponent as accurately as possible. Language barriers can cause misjudgement in percep-
tion of the enemy's approach to conflict or even his next course of action.
Translator-analysts specialized in particular topic areas, such as C3 systems, should
translate Russian writings to guarantee accurate and consistent interpretations.
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III. NAVAL FORCE CONTROL PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The concept of Naval Force Control is structured around control; the control of
forces, the control ofweapons, and the control of technical equipment. Without control,
combat readiness and the achievement of victory in battle could not be accomplished.
This chapter examines the Naval Force Control process; the general concept of control,
the control system, principles of control, and management of the control process. The
conclusions to the chapter will attempt to scrutinize how the Blue commander can gen-
erate a more effective C3 system by acquiring and understanding this knowledge.
B. GENERAL CONCEPT OF CONTROL
Together with matter, motion, and organization, control is one of the basic elements
of the objective world that surrounds us. [Ref. 23 : p. 56]
Control is the influence of a control organ on a controlled object. The general
cybernetic concept of control defines the control process as goal-oriented cyclic input
from the control organ to the controlled object in which status information is obtained
via the feedback channel, decisions are made on the basis of this information, and com-
mands are sent to the controlled object by means of the direct communications channel.
There are three major types of control:
1. control in inanimate nature, including machines and complexes of machines (tech-
nical control);
2. control in living organisms (biological control); and
3. control in human society, in collectives of people in their social life, including the
conduct of armed conflict (social control).
The operations and actions of the subject of control, which correspond to the stages
of the control cycle, are the functions of control. (V.G. Afanas'yev, The Scientific
Control of Society, Politizdat, Moscow, 1968)
The functions of control include planning, organizing, regulating, monitoring, and re-
porting.
• Planning - is the determination of the goal of development of the object that is
controlled and the means of its attainment by working out a plan of operations.
It includes forecasting (future) development and modelling of the objects that are
controlled.
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• Organizing - is the choosing and formulating of the structure of the production
object and the structure of control, determining the relationships between the
structural elements of the system and their interoperations.
• Regulating - is directed at maintaining the required relation between different ele-
ments of the system, at liquidating possible deviations from planned assignments
in the functioning of the object that is controlled.
• Monitoring - consists of observing and inspecting the relation of the actual course
and development of processes or production to the plan of operations.
• Reporting - is the handing in of the results of the execution of the plan or specific
stage of its carrying out. Reporting allows one to have result information and to
systematize it. Reporting also gives the possibility of using an information base for
workine out a program of operations for the system in the subsequent period. [Ref.
24]
Control permeates Soviet life. The Soviets believe that control is necessary for machines
to operate correctly, for organisms to live, for the Soviet state to function, and for mili-
tary formations to conduct combat effectively. [Ref. 25 : p. 7]
Directing the country's armed forces and perfecting control are a crucial area of
Soviet military development. Soviet military science has paid unflagging attention
to this. [Ref. 26 : p. 253]
Control of forces or troops to conduct combat effectively is a branch of military art
known as Naval Force (Troop) Control or Upravleniye Silami (Voyskami), The defi-
nition of Naval Force Control follows:
Naval Force (Troop) Control is the activity of commanders of operational-level
units (tactical-level units, or chiefs of branches of troops and services), staffs, poli-
tical organs, services, and other control organs on maintaining constant combat
readiness of their naval forces (troops) for the carrying out of assigned missions. It
includes:
1. continuous receipt, collection, study, representation, and analysis of data con-
cerning the situation,
2. making a decision about the operation (tactical action),
3. disseminating missions to subordinate naval forces (troops),
4. planning the operation (tactical action),
5. organizing and maintaining mutual interaction,
6. preparing naval forces (troops) and staffs for combat operations and all types of
support,
7. creating a system for Naval Force Control, and
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8. organizing the monitoring of and giving assistance to commanders of subordinate
operational-level (tactical-level) units, stalls, and naval forces (troops). [Ref. 19 :
p. 39]
The fundamental purpose of Naval Force Control is to ensure subordinate forces are
utilized with maximum effectiveness when executing assigned missions in an operation
or battle. [Ref 15 : p. 10] The purpose is satisfied by completion of the following
objectives:
• Maintenance of constant combat readiness, including a high political-morale state.
Constant combat readiness means to be ready at any minute to defend the Soviet state
against any aggressors. This objective fulfills the defensive posture of the Soviet state
of being constantly prepared, both in peacetime and wartime, against aggressive actions,
as well as inspiring forces to accomplish their missions. Maintaining constant combat
readiness is the most important task of commanders and their control systems. The level
of force combat readiness is the basic method of measuring efficiency of control. In-
doctrination of military personnel in the spirit of constant combat readiness is highly
important. Without strict discipline and an awareness of fulfillment in military duty,
maintainence of combat readiness could be futile if lack of morale exists. [Ref. 21 : p.
161] Also, a high political-morale state aids in protecting forces from heavy combat
losses as well as restoring combat capability in the event of the usage of nuclear weap-
ons. [Ref. 27: p. 49]
• Comprehensive preparation of combat operations and direction of the assigned
tactical missions during the course of combat.
Naval Force Control exerted on the ocean battlefield must be exercised with the intent
of achieving results of successfully completing the assigned mission. [Ref. 25 : pp. 25-27]
C. THE CONTROL SYSTEM
Soviet Naval forces can only be effective if those forces have a consistent Soviet
Naval Force Control system. The control system is the total interrelation of control
organs, control points, communications systems, automated systems and other special
systems that support the collection, processing and transmission of information.
Control organs include command, staff, directorates, departments and other per-
manent and temporarily created organs intended to carry out control functions at vari-
ous levels. The basic control organ is the all-fleet (combined-arms) headquarters. The
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all-fleet headquarters directs subordinate control organs to use their forces to execute
assigned missions. [Ref. 15 : p. 4S]
Control points are either fixed or mobile posts specially equipped with the technical
equipment necessary for the control organ to accomplish his mission. The control organ
is usually an operational-level (tactical-level) commander and his staff. The purpose of
control points is to provide stable, flexible, continuous and secure command and control
under any circumstances. [Ref. 25 : p. 96]
The principal control points are command posts. To ensure reliability, survivability
and rapid restoration of command and control, alternate command posts are set up in
case the main command post is disabled. [Ref. 15 : p. 51] Control points consist of
communications centers to provide information within and between control points, and
support, security and service groups which arrange security, defense and technical as-
sistance for the post. [Ref. 15 : p. 52] In the Soviet Navy, there is a command post for
a ship, a command point on a flag ship, and a command post for a fleet or flotilla, [as
trans, from Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, 19S3 in Ref. 19 : p. 102]
The communications system is the technical base for the Naval Force Control sys-
tem. It is responsible for transfer of information between control points and between
the elements of the control points.
The communications system may consist of: a control (regional) communications
net. control point communications centers, command communications lines, tech-
nical control centers, courier-postal communications centers and stations, reserve
communications manpower equipment, and other elements. [Ref. 15: p. 53]
The basic requirements that a communications system must meet are constant combat
readiness, stability, high mobility, necessary capacity, and maintenance of reliability, se-
crecy, and security of transmission of information, [as trans, from Soviet Military Ency-
clopedic Dictionary in Ref. 19 : p. 95] The communications system must allow the
commander and his staff to be continually informed of the situation and react to changes
in a timely manner. [Ref. 25: p. 109]
The revolution in military affairs has placed greater demands upon the efficiency and
effectiveness of control, and also on the level of operational and tactical thinking. In-
tegrated automation of the control process makes it possible for the Naval Force Con-
trol system to meet those requirements which have been placed on it by increased
combat capabilities. [Ref. 27 : p. 3] Automation is the most effective means of improving
the efficiency and effectiveness of control.
There are three basic types of automated control systems:
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1. Automated weapons control system - designed to control weapons and weapons
svstems and increase their effectiveness in executing combat missions. [Ref. 15 : p.
56]
2. Special-purpose automated systems - these system include missile-attack warning,
nuclear detonation data collection and processing, and radiation and chemical sit-
uation svstems; reconnaissance svstems; and hvdrometeorological systems. [Ref. 15
: p. 57]
"
3. Automated systems of control of forces (automated troop control systems) - de-
signed to automate collection, transmission and processing of information, to
complete information and estimation tasks, to conduct mathematical modeling of
operations and predict situations in support of basic control processes. [Ref. 15 :
p. 57]
Automated systems of control of forces (ASUVs) are being developed to meet the
increasing requirements of stability, continuity, efficiency and security of controlling
forces. Due to growing scope and intensity of combat operations, time becomes the
most important factor in decision making. ASUVs augment the human factor in battle
management. They provide management of combat data at a much greater rate than
humanly possible. Thus, the use of ASUVs can enhance tactical decision making. The
Soviets also attempt to program ASUVs with canned variants to different combat situ-
ations. The commander can process continuously updated situational information and
then choose a canned recommendation. [Ref. 28 : pp. 107-108]
D. PRINCIPLES OF NAVAL FORCE CONTROL
The principles of Naval Force Control are general and basic rules that give rec-
ommendations to the commander and his staff to increase the effect of practical control
activities. These principles are interrelated. They include:
• one-man command;
• centralization of control in all component elements with retention by subordinates
of the possibility to show initiative in determiing the means of carrying out the
mission assigned to them;
• firmness and persistence in executing decisions that have been made by superiors;
• efficient and flexible response to situation changes;
• continuity and security; and
• personal responsibility of the commander for decisions made, for the effective use
of his forces, and for the results of the execution of assigned missions. [Ref. 19: p.
112]
The principle of one-man management gives the commander complete authority
over forces subordinate to him, as granted him by the laws of the Soviet state and gov-
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erned by regulations and the orders given by his superior officers. [Ref. 25 : p. 121] The
commander implements the policy of the CPSU and executes the decisions of the Party
and the government. Therefore, he bears total responsibility for all matters concerning
the activities of his forces; morale, discipline, military and political training, combat
readiness, and combat activity. [Ref. 29: p. 724]
Centralization of control implies a situation where the superior command element
unites the various branches of the forces under its command, assigns missions and, in
many cases, provides coordination of the forces to achieve the common combat goal in
accordance with a unified plan. [Ref. 25 : p. 122] Centralization becomes essential when
involved with extremely destructive forces such as nuclear weapons or when conducting
coordinated missile attacks. Battle management in naval warfare can also involve heavy
centralization to coordinate the efforts and requirements of a battlegroup under con-
stantly changing conditions. [Ref. 14 : p. 67]
At the same time, the complex and rapidly changing conditions of combat require
that subordinate commanders take the initiative and make independent decisions con-
cerning tactical actions of their forces. Thus, centralization and decentralization both
play important roles in combat and must be appropriately combined, depending on the
mission and situation conditions. [Ref. 15 : pp. 42-43]
The principle of firm and persistent implementation of decisions demands that a
commander be determined in pursuing his objectives. Execution of mission goals must
be enacted despite difficulties and obstacles that may arise. [Ref. 30 : p. 18] Therefore,
the commander must provide the following:
The commander must make a courageous decision, persistently implement it, retain
control of the subordinates in their hands, preserve organization, and accomplish the
tactical mission in any difficult situation. [Ref. 25 : p. 43]
The commander must have the ability to be flexible and to promptly respond to
changing situations. His control system must allow for smooth transition form one
combat method to another. This faculty must be a quality of the commander's person-
ality and his control system, and can be further developed through training. Training
exercises and maneuvers provide the commander frequently complex and fluctuating
circumstances. [Ref. 30 : p. 18]
Firmness and flexibility are possible only when the commander has "the big picture";
constant and up-to-date information of the actual situation, correct forecasting of it, the
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objective analysis to make the decision based on this information, and the ability to
mobilize his forces to carry out his decisions. [Ref. 25 : p. 44]
Continuity of control ensures constant communications with forces, constant
situational information to the commander and his staff, and the ability to exert influence
on combat operations using available forces and resources. Continuity can only be at-
tained by the survivability of the Naval Force Control system [Ref. 25 : p. 44] A solid
control system should be employed by constructing an alternate control system, dis-
persing command posts, and setting up alternate and reserve communications systems.
[Ref. 30: p. 19]
Security of control specifies preventing leakage of information concerning the
strength, organization, location, missions, condition of material and training, before and
during operations whether peacetime or wartime. [Ref. 31 : p. 19] The essence of secu-
rity is to uphold secrecy to retain all command and control measures from the enemy.
[Ref. 25 : p. 45] Usually, the greater the security of communications, the higher the
forces' command and control secrecy. Security can be enhanced by concealing the
movements of the command post and limiting the number of personnel who are involved
in planning of combat operations. [Ref. 29 : p. 724]
The principle of personal responsiblity of the commander stresses the fact that the
commander must answer to the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government
for the continual combat and mobilization readiness of his forces as well as his achieve-
ment of assigned missions. [Ref. 15 : p. 44] Only the commander has the authority to
make the decision (within the guidance of his superiors). Thus, the commander must
be held personally responsible for his decision.
Principles of control have a historic character and are subject to change. Principles
can change in accordance with further development of scientific and technical progress,
more rational organization of work of staffs or headquarters, and new methods of ac-
complishing basic missions of control [Ref. 31 : p. 66]
E. MANAGEMENT OF NAVAL FORCE CONTROL
In order for a commander to control his forces in battle, and thus, fulfill the objec-
tives of control, certain functions must be administered. These functions are performed
both in the preparation of and during combat operations. [Ref. 25 : p. 26]
• Acquiring and processing situation information.
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Information must be continuous, reliable, timely, and exist in the necessary volume to
provide positional/situational data on enemy forces, own forces, and also data on pres-
ent conditions of conducting the operation.
• Making (or amplifying) the decision and planning combat operations.
A decision is the result of the creative thought and will of the commander and defines
the objective of the combat operations and the forces, resources, procedures, and times
for achieving it and also the missions of his subordinates. [Ref. 25 : p. 31] The decision
is crucial to control. Control decisions in the Soviet Navy are now aided by computers.
Combat data can be entered and processed to provide recommendations for decision-
making by the commander. [Ref. 32 : p. 18] : p. 31]
The decision is also the basis for planning. Planning consists of detailing and spec-
ification of the decision by the commander's staff and the chiefs of the branches of forces
and services under the leadership of the commander; sequences, methods and time of
execution by forces, distribution of forces and their efforts, supplies and provisions
needed, etc. [Ref. 31 : p. 17] Planning begins when the commander makes his decision
and concludes with the formulation and approval of an operation or battle plan. There
are two methods for planning combat operations; sequential and parallel. Sequential
planning involves planning of combat operations separately at each command level; as
planning is completed at one echelon, the mission is disseminated at the next subordi-
nate echelon. Parallel or concurrent planning involves planning operations in which
subordinate and higher echelons start working simultaneously, at their own level, on
planning the upcoming operation. This method allows rapid planning, which becomes
an advantage when time is limited. [Ref. 25 : pp. 229-230]
• Disseminating tactical missions to forces and organizing their coordination.
Forces must obtain the specific combat problem and have time to comprehend and
prepare for the execution of the assigned mission. For this to happen, timely decison
making is necessary as well as skillful selection of the most reliable and effective method
of disseminating tasks under the given conditions and by monitoring the passage of op-
eration documents and command signals and their correct understanding by subordi-
nates. [Ref. 15 : p. 11]
• Comprehensive support of combat operations.
This function creates the conditions necessary for subunits of the branches of forces to
successfully execute their tactical missions against the enemy. [Ref 25 : p. 36] The
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Soviets divide support into four types: combat (operational), special, rear, and technical.
Combat support includes reconnaissance, defense against nuclear weapons, physical se-
curity, radioelectronic warfare, cover and deception, (maskirovka), and engineer support.
Special support contains subjects such as topogeodesic and hydrometeorological sup-
port. Rear support includes transportation, medical support and housing. Technical
support covers rocket, artillery, and motor vehicle engineering. [Ref. 28 : p. 106]
• Organization and execution of political work with forces.
The specific mission of this function is to ensure the formation of strong morale in
each officer, seargent, and soldier; their complete understanding and implementation
of the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government; maintenance of high troop
combat readiness; knowledge by personnel of the objectve and the nature of the war
being waged and of their specific mission: strengthening of their psychological state;
certainty of success, courage, and an urge for the offensive. [Ref. 25: p. 37]
• Preparation of forces for forthcoming combat operations.
This function once again signifies the importance Soviets have assigned to combat
readiness through practice and training as well as directing and controlling forces during
the course of combat. The subordinate forces must understand the mission exactly in
the same manner as the commander assigned it. There should be no varying interpre-
tations of the mission and it should be clearly specified who is doing what, where, and
when. [Ref 21 : p. 185]
• Organization and maintenance of constant tactical command and control.
This function establishes the need for a control system [Ref. 25 : p. 39]; control organs
to organize missions and goals, an appropriate arrangement of control posts, necessary
communications equipment between the control organs and subordinate forces, and
automated systems to aid in controlling complexity and time factors.
• Monitoring forces' readiness and their execution of tactical mission.
By monitoring and assisting subordinate commanders, staffs, and forces, the most ef-
fective execution of missions can be achieved and mistakes can either be averted or
quickly corrected. [Ref. 15: p. 12] Monitoring consists of studying the actual situation
among the forces and eliminating any deficiencies or discrepancies discovered. [Ref. 25 :
P . 39]
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Control is the keyword of Soviet society. It is a process which is relevant in all as-
pects of Soviet life. The goals of the Communist Party and its ideological commitment
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to the state are accomplished through control. The Soviets believe that without control,
the hold of the CPSU would weaken, chaos would ensue, and society could not exist in
an organized and effective manner.
The CPSU maintains stringent control of the Soviet armed forces through the con-
cept of troop control; more specifically, the CPSU controls its naval forces through the
concept of Naval Force Control. Naval Force Control is a process which functions to
create and maintain combat readiness, fighting efficiency, and the ability to control
forces during execution of assigned missions.
The principles of control include one-man command, centralization, firmness and
flexibility of control, continuity and security, and personal responsibility of the
commander. These principles become harder to observe and enforce as modern combat
becomes more complex with the use of more destructive weapons, automated computer
systems, and the faster pace of the battle.
Management of control gives the commander the capability to control his forces in
combat. To correctly assess the combat situation and provide the desired action to be
executed by his subordinate forces, the commander and his staff must have the ability
to collect, process and study situational data. He uses his decision making process to
select the best course of action, then plans the operation, assigns the mission to his
forces and organizes the coordination of the mission. Subordinate forces should clearly
understand the mission exactly as the commander perceived it. Support of the combat
operation must also be provided, such as logistic, technical or medical support, and the
political and morale preparation of forces. A control system consisting of the
commander and his staff, control posts, and interconnecting communications equipment
should be organized and maintained to provide tactical command and control for the
mission. Finally, the execution of the mission must be constantly monitored and cor-
rected or revised as necessary.
The complex conditions of modern combat operations, the fast and changing pace
of the battle, the tremendously destructive weapons of today, and the decreasing time
limit to act in situations force the commander to make timely decisions under much
duress. Integrated automation assists the commander in concluding the decision-making
process by accepting and synthesizing combat data to produce recommendations. These
recommendations are based on Soviet canned responses to various combat situations.
This promotes more efficient decision-making by commanders, especially those weak in
the area. Thus, automated systems, including ASUVs that enhance human capabilities
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in battle management, are viewed by the Soviets as having the ability to raise overall!
combat operational effectiveness. Yet, ASUVs can also stifle initiative by training the
commander to choose a canned response vice thinking for himself. This may become
evident when a seldom occurring or new combat situation arises for which there are n©
appropriate canned responses. Centralization of forces allows the use of resources to
be flexible and meet diverse requirements. It is especially important and used rigidly by-
higher echelon commanders when operational plans involve the use or coordination of
highly destructive weapons, such as nuclear weapons or missiles. Decentralization of
control is also important under appropriate conditions. Quickly changing, offensive
operations in the naval arena may demand increased initiative on the part of unit and, or
ship commanders. Of course, in the Soviet Navy, initiative cams a price tag; the
commander is held personally responsible for his actions, the actions of his subordinate
forces, and the accomplishment of the mission. He is supposed to act within the goals
of the Communist Party and his military superiors. Penalties for deviations could be
severe enough to quelch ideas of initiative when the situation needs it and enforce fol-
lowing the operational plan. Also, decentralization is not a concept that is allowed fre-
quently by the high command ashore controlling the commander at sea. This
infrequency in transferring control of operations to the afloat commander could make
him indecisive, unwilling to use initiative and tend to adhere to the course of action se-
lected by the ASUV.
Americans tend to define initiative in terms of creativity and aggressiveness. Per-
haps the Soviets define initiative as the ability to adapt to changing situations and make
appropriate decisions based on the laws of armed warfare. In other words, the Soviet
commander should be able to deal with any situation because he has been given ASUVs
and a sound background in military thought that allows him to make the necessary de-
cisions. Even in decentralization, the higher echelons remain in control. The Soviet
Union is not interested in creative, imaginative commanders. They are interested in
building a strong system of firm, capable leaders who fulfill the goals and objectives of
the state.
The Blue commander and his forces will need to comprehend the Soviet concept of
control and its application to Naval Force Control. Control is the all-encompassing
strength of the Soviet Union. Indoctrination into the general concept of control and the
principles and management of Naval Force Control will permit Blue forces a better
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perception of how the Soviets control and apply the Red naval C3 system in the exe-
cution of an assigned mission.
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IV. SOVIET NAVAL FORCES
A. INTRODUCTION
In understanding the Soviet naval C3 process, it is necessary to examine their naval
forces. This chapter briefly outlines the overall structure and organization of the Soviet
Navy in peacetime and wartime, as well as the individual Soviet fleets. The missions of
the Soviet Navy are discussed and a more specific examination of naval forces is made,
including submarines, naval aviation, principle surace combatants, and amphibious and
mine warfare forces. Future trends in the Soviet Navy are also examined. The conclu-
sions to the chapter attempt to answer questions of how the Blue force commander can
generate a more effective C3 system by acquiring and understanding this knowledge.
B. THE SOVIET NAVY WITHIN THE SOVIET STATE
The Blue force commander must understand the structure of the Soviet Navy; both
the peacetime and wartime command and control structures. The Soviet Navy is one
of Five services that compose the Soviet Armed Forces. The other services include the
Strategic Rocket Forces, the Ground Forces, the Air Forces and the Troops of National
Air Defense.
1. Peacetime Command and Control Structure
Supreme leadership of the USSR's Armed Forces is vested by the Soviet Constitu-
tion in the CPSU and in the highest bodies of the Soviet Government - the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers. Party dominance
of the armed forces is assured through its decisionmaking authority and power over
personnel appointments. [Ref. 33 : p. 18]
The Soviet Union has two governing structures, the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, and the nominal government represented by the Council of Ministers.
Both structures place great emphasis on defense. Both structures are also linked to-
gether. Key government ofFicials are Party members, under the control of Pary direc-
tives. Also, Soviet policy is formulated by both Party and government representatives
in decision making committees. In general, the Party has the authority to formulate
policy. The government ratifies Party policy and proceeds in its implementation. [Ref.
34 : p. 2]
The CPSU and its Central Committee are directly involved with the daily con-




about two dozen officials from the Party's Central Committee. The Politburo is the
USSR's top decision making committee and the final authority on all national decisions.
The Central Committee does not have decision making authority; it is a body of over
400 members that meet several times a year for missions of socialization and personal
status rather than policymaking. [Ref. 35 : p. 119]
Theoretically, the Supreme Soviet is the legislative arm of the Soviet state. "In
practice this body is ornamental and serves as a facade. However, membership in this
group does carry certain prestige and helps to establish position." The Defense Minister,
his deputies and commanders of forces abroad, militry districts, and fleets serve as
members of the Supreme Soviet. [Ref. 18 : p. 118] The Council of Ministers consists of
about one hundred ministers who supervise the production and implementation of all
industrial goods and services in the Soviet Union. [Ref. 35 : p. 120] The Council directs
all aspects of Soviet economic development and organizes the management of industry,
transportation, construction, and communications. The Council provides overal direc-
tion for armed forces development and civil defense, and ratifies military manpower is-
sues. [Ref. 34 : p. 11]
In peacetime, the Soviet Navy and the other services are administratively sub-
ordinate to the Defense Ministry. The primary7 role of the Defense Ministry is to coor-
dinate and manage the actions of its main directorates with those of the armed forces.
[Ref. 29 : p. 725] The Defense Minister, who is a military officer, is in charge of all
military forces and defense activities. His responsibilities involve officer recruitment and
conscription of enlisted presonnel; equipping the forces with weapon systems and mili-
tary material; developing military strategy, operational art, and tactics; training the
forces; and ensuring high standards of military discipline and political loyalty. The De-
fense Minister maintains control of the armed forces via three first deputy ministers and
eleven deputy ministers of defense. The first deputy ministers include the Chief of the
General Staff, the Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces, and the Chief of the Army. Five
of th eleven deptuy ministers are Commanders-in-Chiefs (CINCs) of the five services.
[Ref. 33 : p. 18] The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, like the other CINCs, are re-
sponsible for peacetime administrative management. The Navy CINC holds little or no
control over the operational deployment of naval forces. [Ref. 29 : p. 725]
The Main Political Directorate is the prime tool that the Central Committee of
the CPSU uses to exercise political control of the armed forces. The primary objective
is the implementation of Party policies in the military, incorporated in decrees and orders
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issued by the Chief of the Directorate. This Party instrument infiltrates all headquarters
of Soviet military forces down to the company level. Political officers are trained and
directed to indoctrinate all personnel, build morale programs, and assure political reli-
ability. [Ref. 13 : p. 2-6]
The Chief of the General Staff is next in command after the Defense Minister.
The General Staff is the highest staff body of the Soviet armed forces and exercises
peacetime force management. Principal responsibilities include devising plans for the
development and employment of the military and ensuring forces are maintained at a
high level of combat readiness. [Ref. 29: p. 725]
The General Staff is directly subordinate to the Main Military Council. The
Main Military Council, chaired by the Defense Minister, is the highest controlling au-
thority in the military chain of command and is concerned with the strategic direction
and leadership of the Soviet armed forces. [Ref. IS : p. 99] Other members of the
Council are the Chief of the General Staff and all of the Deputy Defense Ministers (in-
cluding the Navy CINC). [Ref. 29 : p. 725]
The Main Military Council is subordinate to the Defense Council, the highest
politico-military decisionmaking body. The Council unifies Soviet leadership, both mil-
itary and civilian, and provides centralized direction to the state economy and to military
operations. [Ref. 13 : p. 2-1] The Defense Council supervises the country's preparation
for war and ensures plans for mobilization, transportation, and manpower meet the re-
quirements for war at all possible degrees of intensity. "It has the power to form new
staffs, create new military districts, or change the entire structure of the Soivet Armed
Forces." [Ref. IS : p. 99] In peacetime, all strategic forces are under the operational
control of the Defense Council. The Council is chaired by the General Secretary of the
CPSU and members include the Defense Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, and a
number of Party and state officials. [Ref. 29 : p. 725]
The Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff exercises operational
control over the activities of the Soviet armed forces in peacetime. Soviet home-based
fleets and squadrons deployed overseas are controlled by the Main Operations
Directorate through the Main Naval Staff. (In peacetime, the Trans-Causcasian Mili-
tary District Commander controls the Caspian Flotilla.) [Ref. 29 : p. 725]
2. Wartime Command and Control Structure
In time of war or general mobilization, significant changes are made to the
command and control structure. Figure 4 on page 40 reflects the high command struc-
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ture changes. [Ref. 36: p. 11] These changes must be rapid and efficient transformation
of a peacetime national security organization into a military operational command ca-
pable of achieving all major political and military objectives in a general war. Shifting
to wartime operations will incur minimal organizational disturbances and few additions
to membership. [Ref. 33 : p. 19]
The Defense Council would be converted to the State Defense Council (GKO),
whose main responsibility is to guarantee the centralized direction of all military and
political actions of the country. Membership would expand to include representatives
of the highest Party, state, and military leadership. The Council would be chaired by the
General Secretary7 of the Soviet Union, functioning as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief
of the Soviet armed forces. [Ref. 29 : p. 725]
The Supreme High Command (VGK) or Stavka, would replace the Defense
Ministry and the Main Military Council. Members would include the General Secretary,
the Defense Minister, the Chief of the General Staff and other first deputies of defense,
the Chief of the Main Political Directorate and the armed forces' Commanders-in Chiefs.
[Ref. 33 : p. 20] The Supreme High Command would be formed strictly for the strategic
direction of the war. The General Staff would become the operational stall and execu-
tive agent of the Supreme High Command, incorporating the Main Naval Staff. The
Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff would draft strategic operational plans
for review and approval by the Stavka VGK, and would be responsible for ensuring
timely execution of the plans by operational commanders. [Ref. 33 : p. 21]
In the late 1970s, the Soviets divided the USSR's territory and periphery into
general areas of potential conflict. These areas are called theaters of military action or
TVD {Teatr voyennykh deystviy). [Ref 29 : p. 725] The focus of operational planning is
at the level of the TVD. The preparation of a TVD is established during peacetime;
construction of transportation routes, airfields, naval bases, etc. Theaters are also
"activitated" for training and exercises. Preparation continues in the course of war as
forces are mobilized and deployed on a TVD basis. [Ref. 37 : p. 3]
In wartime, the Soviets engage intermediate High Commands of Forces (HCF)
in TVD areas that would be under the influence of the Stavka VGK. HCFs are re-
sponsible for ensuring centralized control of strategic planning and decentralized battle
management, and directing subordinate forces. The TVD HCF is a combined arms
command, and thus, subordinate forces include ground, naval, and air assets. [Ref. 33 :
p. 21]
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Maritime and ocean TVDs {morskoy (okeanskiyj teair voyennykh deystviy) are
defined as areas of water and space in which naval operations can take place during
wartime. The entire elobe is not divided into MTVDs; thev are limited to waters sur-
rounding Eurasia. [Ref. 38 : p. 32] MTVD areas include the Northern Seas (Arctic), the
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Kamchatka
Sea. MTVDs can be integral parts of a land TVD. Thus, naval forces could be either
independently employed under the control of the respective martime or ocean TVD, or
in conjunction with land TVD forces. The three ocean TVDs (OTVD) cover the
Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans. The OTVD is where strategic missions are carried
out by the Soviet Navy. [Ref. 29 : pp. 725-728]
MTVDs are comprised of zones. These zones are smaller regions where a spe-
cific operation is planned or a specified condition is expected to take place at a certain
time. The four Soviet fleets provide the naval forces that operate in zones of the
MTVDs. OTVDs do not contain zones of operation but can be divided into quadrants.
[Ref 38 : p. 12] There are no permanent commanders of MTVDs; commanders and their
command posts and forces are assigned to MTVDs or zones of MTVDs. [Ref. 38: p. 9]
3. Soviet Navy Organization
The CINC of the Soviet Navy is also a deputy minister of defense. He is the
chief advisor of the Defense Minister on naval policy. Several deputy CINCs support
the Navy CINC, including a First Deputy CIXC, a Chief of the Main Naval Staff which
is involved in current operations and long-range planning, and a Chief of the Political
Directorate. Not all deputy CINC responsibilities have been identified by Western
sources. Known principle areas of responsibility include combat training, naval educa-
tion, rear services (logistics) and shipbuilding and armaments. [Ref. 36 : p. 15]
The four fleet commanders and the commander of the Caspian flotilla are di-
rectly subordinate to the First Deputy CINC. See Figure 5 on page 41 for a diagram
of Soviet Navy organization. [Ref. 36 : p. 15]
C. SOVIET NAVAL FLEETS
Although the Soviet Union has almost 28,000 miles of coastline, it has very few
ports. Most of the coast is barricaded by ice for part or all of the year and most of the
important Soviet naval bases have to be constantly kept "open" by icebreakers in the
winter. Only the Black Sea offers warm and ice-free ports. [Ref. 39 : p. 253] Geography
increases the impact of this handicap. Territory accessible to sea avenues are located
at only four points of the country. These four points-two from inland seas (the Baltic
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Figure 5. Soviet Navy Organization
and Black Seas), one on the Arctic Sea and the other in the Far East-are separated by
vast distances. These point also constitute the home-based location of the Soviet Navy's
fleets. The four fleets are not only cut off from each other by distance but are located
in recessed ports in relation to the ocean. Narrows or straits of various widths must be
passed in order to reach the open sea. [Ref. 40 : p. 18] Therefore, in wartime, the Soviet
Navy's fleets are denied the power of concentration of forces by easily combining units
from different fleets, and must pass throug narrows or straits when entering or leaving
ports that can be placed under enemy surveillance.
The Soviet Navy consists of four major fleets: the Northern Fleet, the Baltic Fleet,
the Black Sea Fleet, and the Pacific Ocean Fleet. One flotilla also exists; the Caspian
Flotilla which is a remnant of the 12 lake, river, and sea flotillas that were employed
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during World War II. [Ref. 36 : p. 17] In times of peace, fleet commanders report di-
rectly to the Main Navy Staff and maintain operational control of all general purpose
afloat and ashore forces within their fleet areas. However, in wartime, the fleet CINCs
become the naval component commanders of the combined arms high command in their
corresponding TVD. [Ref. 33 : p. 81]
Fleet organization consists of surface, subsurface and air assets, naval infantry,
coastal defense, and naval base commands. Naval forces are organized into eskadra
(task force), diviziya (flotilla), brigada (squadron), and divizion (division). The number
of assets assigned to each group is dependent upon the mission of the group. [Ref. 13 :
p. 9-4]
1. Northern Fleet
The Northern Fleet is mainly based in the Kola Peninsula and White Sea areas.
Fleet headquarters is located at Severomorsk. The Northern Fleet is the fleet that is
least encumbered by geography and has direct access to the Atlantic. Therefore it is
responsible for wartime operations in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. Northern Fleet
bases are usually free from ice throughout the year but operating conditions can often
be very bad. [Ref. 41 : p. 121] The Northern Fleet comprises almost 50 percent of the
Soviet Navy's submarines, some 26 percent of the surface warships (frigates and larger
units) about 27 percent of the naval aircraft, and 26 percent of the naval personnel.
2. Baltic Fleet
The Baltic Fleet is responsible for operations in that specific area. Its access to
the high seas is by way of the Danish Straits and then either south through the English
Channel or north between Scotland and Norway. These straits are controlled by NATO
forces; therefore, during times of conflict. Atlantic operations are left to the Northern
Fleet. Primary missions of the Baltic Fleet during wartime would embody supporting
army operations and conducting amphibious and other naval operations with the goal
of attaining control of the Danish Straits and denying the use of the Baltic Sea to enemy
surface ships. Forces are comprised of 12 percent of the Navy's submarines, 16 percent
of its surface warships, 16 percent of its aircraft, and roughly 19 percent of its personnel.
Fleet headquarters is situated at Baltiysk near the Lithuanian port of Kaliningrad. [Ref.
36 : p. 19-22.] The Baltic Sea ports are icebound through much of the year.
3. Black Sea Fleet
The Black Sea Fleet is responsible for naval operations in the Black Sea. This
fleet also provides surface warships and air assets for operations in the Mediterranean
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Sea as the Fifth Eskadra. [Ref. 36 : p. 22] To enter the Mediterranean, the Black Sea
Fleet has to navigate the Dardanelles, and from there, leave by either transiting the Suez
Canal or the Straits of Gibraltar. [Ref. 41 : p. 121] The Black Sea Fleet has 26 percent
of the Soviet Navy's major combatants, nine percent of its submarines (no nuclear or
ballistic missile subs), 27 percent of its aircraft and 20 percent of its personnel. Fleet
headquarters is located at Sevastopol. [Ref. 36 : p. 23]
4. Pacific Fleet
The Pacific Fleet is the largest of the four Soviet fleets. Approximately one-
third of the submarines of the Soviet Navy belong to the Pacific fleet, along with 29
percent of the major surface warships, 30 percent of the naval aircraft, and 33 percent
of the manpower. The Pacific Fleet also has the largest operating area of any of the
fleets. Responsibilities include operations throughout the Pacific, providing most of the
ships that deploy to the Indian Ocean, and defending the Soviet Siberian coast. [Ref. 36
: pp. 23-25] The Pacific Fleet is based at Vladivostok but also uses naval ports at
Sovietskaya Gavan, Magaden, and Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The
fleet's SSBN force operates out of the port of Petropavlovsk while most of the larger
warships are based at Vladivostok, Sovietskaya Gavan and the newer port of Korsakov
on the southern end of the island of Sakhalin. The Pacific Fleet can access the ocean
by the Tsushima and La Perouse Straits. Two other straits—the Tsugaru and Korean
Straits-are controlled by Japan and South Korea respectively, but cannot be expected
to be blockaded in times of conflict due to the dependence of Japan and Korea on
maritime trade that transits those straits. The Pacific Fleet also suffers from icebound
ports in winter but manages to remain operational via extensive ice-breaking efforts at
Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. [ Ref. 41 : p. 121]
5. Caspian Sea Flotilla
The Caspian Sea Flotilla is a small, limited patrol force operating in the Caspian
Sea. A canal built from the Black Sea allows the transfer of ships no larger than de-
stroyers to enter the inland sea. The Caspian Sea Flotilla consists of five frigates, five
patrol ships, 20 patrol craft, 25 minesweepers, 28 landing craft, several auxiliary ships,
no aircraft, and about 4000 personnel. [Ref. 36 : p. 23]
D. MISSIONS OF THE SOVIET NAVY
Soviet naval missions are stated as:
1. deterrence in peace and war, primarily through strategic submarines; related to this
is the role of providing naval protection for SSBNs,
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2. protection of the homeland against seaborne attack from U.S. CVBG forces, in-
cluding air strikes, cruise missiles fired from naval platforms, and amphibious in-
vasion,
3. destruction of Western SSBNs,
4. destruction of the enemy's ASW threat,
5. interdiction of the sea lines of communications, and
6. naval combat support of ground forces. [Ref. 42 : p. 27]
The Soviets maintain the largest ballistic missile submarine force in the world. Its
mission is strategic attack, or more clearly, nuclear strike against the enemy. Two-thirds
of these submarines are fitted with long-range sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)
that allow them to remain in their homeports while still completing their mission of
striking targets in the United States. [Ref. 43 : p. 12]
The role of protecting the strategic submarine force at all times is a top priority for
all Soviet naval forces. This "pro-SSBN" requirement involves protection of all
forward-deployed submarines throughout their mission profile, whether the submarines
are leaving or returning to base, are vulnerable to attack by U.S. SSXs, or are on station
(where each SSBN normally may have two escorting SSNs). This function also entails
protection of the SSBN force that stays in home waters (Delta and Typhoon classes) or
patrols under the Arctic ice fringe. [Ref. 42: p. 28]
The mission of providing for the strategic defense of the Soviet Union centers on
eliminating naval threats approaching within weapons range of the Soviet homeland.
[Ref. 43: p. 14]
Soviet naval forces are tasked with protecting the Soviet homeland from three types
of threats: deep strategic nuclear strikes or "operational" strikes against Soviet ground
and air forces by aircraft launched from aircraft carriers, naval platforms that are
equipped with cruise missiles, and "strategic scale" amphibious landings (defined as
landings that open major new ground fronts). [Ref. 42 : p. 29] The Soviet requirement
for an anti-carrier battle group capability will definitely remain a high priority as the
U.S. Navy strengthens its carrier battleforce in numbers as well as in conventional and
nuclear Tomahawk missiles.
Destruction of Western SSBNs requires the Soviet Navy to have the open-ocean
ASW capability to locate patrolling U.S. SSBNs. In the early 1960s, an attack on a
Soviet SSBN would have triggered a nuclear response, but that is probably no longer
true. The Soviet Navy has a mission to destroy Western SSBNs during the conventional
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phase of a war, and it expects similar efforts against its own SSBXs. Nuclear war is not
likely to be initiated from the sea in response to the loss of a SSBN unless the war has
turned nuclear on land. [Ref. 42: p. 87]
Development of forces to counter the ASW power of the U.S. Navy and its allies is
a continuing and highly emphasized program. [Ref. 43 : p. 15] This mission is gaining
priority in the Soviet hierarchy of missions, evidenced by increased research and devel-
opment in ASW-related and space programs. Strategic ASW may belong higher up in
the order of mission priorities.
Sea lines of communications or SLOC interdiction is a mission that attempts to in-
terrupt merchant and military shipping lanes used for the reinforcement and resupply
of Imperialist nations during a major, prolonged war. The priority of this mission de-
pends on the circumstances; more specifically, the nature and length of the conflict. A
sustained, conventional war would precipitate an anti-SLOC mission with the hopes, for
example, of inhibiting shipping across the Atlantic and weakening NATO's support from
North America. On the other hand, a nuclear war of short duration might place SLOC
interdiction lower on the priority list. [Ref. 43 : p. 16]
The main Soviet weapon in SLOC interdiction is the submarine. "Moreover, there
are strong indications that the Soviet Navy believes that attack on the West's ports
would be at least as cost effective as attack on shipping still at sea." Other alternatives
are the mining of enemy port and harbor approaches and the use of land-based missile-
carrying aircraft. [Ref. 41 : pp. 187-188]
Naval combat support of ground forces involves conducting amphbious landings of
operational and tactical scale to support Warsaw Pact ground force in both offensive
and defensive operations, countering enemy amphibious landing operations, and pro-
viding direct missile, gunfire, and air support for ground forces operating in coastal sec-
tors. Other naval objectives include the seizure of strategically important islands, naval
bases, ports and straits. Possible naval support of land operations could take place in
the Baltic and Black Seas. Not only could ground forces advancing westward be sup-
ported, but also the Danish and Turkish Straits could be controlled, closing off the Baltic
and Black Seas to Western intervention. Seizure of the Danish Strait could lead to the
Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet reaching the North Sea and the waters beyond. [Ref. 41 : p. 179]
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E. SUBMARINES
The submarine force of the Soviet Union is the most significant strength of the
Soviet Navy and is the largest submarine force in the world. The submarine's principal
missions are comprised of:
• executing a land-attack mission,
• denying hostile surface and submarine forces access to Soviet waters, and
• conducting reconnaissance and strike missions against surface shipping on the high
seas. [Ref. 44 : p. 1]
To execute these missions, the Soviets have created a force that numbers over 360 active
submarines. Almost half of this force is nuclear powered. See Figure 6 on page 47 for
a list of Soviet submarine strengths as of January 1987. [Ref. 45 : p. 1383]
Currently, the Soviets are involved in an intensive submarine development program.
Nine classes of submarines are either being built or tested, representing a new generation
of submarines that place emphasis on quieting, speed, nuclear propulsion, and weapon
versatility. [Ref. 33 : p. 82]
In general, Soviet submarines are apt to be faster, dive deeper, and carry more
weapons than U.S. subs. However, their noise levels and sonar equipment have, in the
past, been considered as inferior. Today, Soviet technological improvements are making
it ever harder for U.S. ASW forces to find Soviet submarines. The Soviets have been
constructing submarines with a double hull design. The double hull improves drag and
noise characteristics. The design consists of an outer protective hull ^nd an inner,
stronger pressure hull. Buoyancy tanks and equipment are placed between the hulls.
[Ref. 36 : p. Ill] This double hull design would probably enable a submarine to absorb
minor damage to the outer hull from a relatively small warhead, such as a U.S. Navy
Mark 46 torpedo, and still continue to operate. [Ref. 44 : p. 9]
Anechoic coating is another method used by the Soviets to improve submarine qui-
eting. Echo absorbing, rubber-like material covers the hull to reduce active sonar
transmissions of hull noise. However, anechoic coatings may interfere with incoming
passive signals that Soviet sonar operators listen for, thus possibly decreasing the sub-
marine's sonar detection range. [Ref. 46: p. 763]
Four new classes of nuclear-attack submarines have been introduced since 1983; the
Mike, Sierra, Yankee, and Akula. The Mike SSN is reported to be much quieter than
previous Soviet attack submarines and carries more weapons. The titanium hull allows
the Mike greater diving depths. It is capable of firing a variety of submarine-launched
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Submarines Baltic Northern Black Caspian Pacific Total
Fleet Sea Sea Fleet
Ballistic Missile 6 39 32 77
- (38) - (25) (63)
Guided Missile 3 32 2 26 63
- (25) - (23) (48)
Long-range
attack 12 S5 5 38 140
- (50) - (22) (72)
Medium-range
attack IS 2 24 22 66
Special Purpose 5 4 5 16
TOTAL 41 163 35 123 362
(113) (70) (183)
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate nuclear powered submarines.
About 100 submarines in reserve have n ot been included.
Figure 6. Strength of Soviet Submarine Force (January 1987)
weapons, including ASW weapons such as SS-N-15 nuclear depth bombs and SS-N-16s
with conventional homing torpedo warheads. [Ref. 33 : p. 82] The Mike SSN has been
identified as a possible candidate for SS-N-21 land-attack cruise missiles. The SS-N-21
is similar to the U.S. Tomahawk missile. Range is estimated to be 1600 nautical miles.
Possible missions for the Mike SSN would probably take place in the North Atlantic or
off the east coast of the United States. These missions could include launchins its
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SS-N-21 missiles at land targets such as naval installations and strategic bomber bases,
and intercepting U.S. naval units deploying from their home ports. [Ref. 44 : pp. 14-15]
The Sierra SSN is thought to be the successor to the Victor III SSN class. It is
quieter, has an improved sonar, a higher speed, and a greater operating depth due to a
possible titanium hull. It is also assumed by Western analysts that the Sierra is outfitted
to carry SS-N-21 missiles [Ref. 36 : p. 141], as well as SS-N-15 and SS-N-16 missiles, and
wire-guided torpedoes. The Sierra will deploy with the Northern and Pacific fleet "...and
will conduct a hunter-killer mission in support of Soviet ballistic missiles and cruise
missile submarines." [Ref. 44 : p. 17]
The Yankee SSN is a converted Yankee SSBN; the ballistic missile tubes were re-
moved and associated fire control equipment either completely or partially dismantled.
One Yankee SSN was fully operational by the end of 1985. Other Yankee SSBNs are
reported to be in the process of conversion to attack submarines. There are also possible
plans for converted Yankee nuclear-powered cruise missile-equipped submarines. They
could be candidates for carrying a second variant of the Soviet land-attack cruise missile,
the SS-NX-24, which would be larger than the SS-N-21. The SS-NX-24 has a supersonic
speed, estimated to be about Mach 2. The range of this missile permits a variety of
targets such as ports, industrial targets, airfields, and command and control centers.
[Ref. 44 : p. 16]
The first of the Akula class SSN was launched in 1984 and is similar to the Victor
III and Sierra SSNs. It is believed to have a titanium hull as well as advanced quieting
techniques. The Akula SSN carries SS-N-16 ASW missiles and is a probable candidate
for the SS-N-21 land-attack cruise missiles. [Ref. 36 : p. 139]
Soviet determination to continue the development of SSBNs and torpedo tube-
launched SLCM deployment is emphasized by the Typhoon, Delta and Oscar class
submarines. The largest undersea craft ever built (25,000 tons submerged), the Typhoon
is the first Soviet SSBN to combine long-range capabilities with a multiple warhead
payload. The Typhoon class carries 20 SS-N-20 Sturgeon missiles (MIRV) that have a
range of 4500 nautical miles. This missile is presumed to be the most accurate SLBM
in the Soviet arsenal. Thus, the Typhoon can fire the missiles from secure distances.
The sail design of the Typhoon indicates an ice-penetrating capability and it is presumed
that the submarine will be employed for extended patrols underneath the Arctic ice cap.
[Ref. 44 : p. 10] It would surface through the ice to fire its missiles. [Ref. 36 : p. 114]
The Delta IV class submarines, which are assigned to the Northern fleet, are also con-
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figured for under-ice operations. It carries 16 SS-N-23 SLBMs specifically developed for
the Delta IV. The SS-N-23 is a ten MIRV missile with a 4500 nautical mile range. [Ref.
47: p. 24] The Oscar class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine is equipped with 24
SS-N-19 antiship cruise missiles that are submerged-launched from vertical launch tubes
and have a maximum range estimated at 250-300 nautical miles. These missiles will
probably be targeted against NATO carrier battle groups. [Ref. 33 : p. 55]
Close to half of the Soviet submarine force is driven by diesel electric engines. The
diesel engines are used when the sub is moving on the surface. When submerged, diesel
boats switch over to battery-powered electric motors that allow the submarine to remain
underwater for up to 150 hours. Diesel-electric boats have their advantages over
nuclear-powered boats; they cost less to build, they do not require a highly trained nu-
clear engineering crew, they are very quiet, and they can become totally silent by turning
off their battery. [Ref. 41 ; p. 262] When diesel boats are operating on their batteries,
they are difficult to detect and can be particularly effective in confined waters, choke
points and in coastal defense missions. [Ref 43 : p. 29] The Soviet Navy continues its
diesel-powered program with the production of the Kilo class attack submarine. This
SS is expected to conduct shallow water operations in the seas adjacent to the Soviet
Union.
F. SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION
Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) is comprised of some 55,000 men and 1,650 aircraft
directly subordinate to the Soviet Navy and divided between the four fleet areas.
Figure 7 on page 50 gives the strength of the SNA as of early 1987. [Ref. 36 : p. 55]
Antiship strike and patrol/ASW aircraft are apportioned to each fleet. Long-range
ASW and Bear reconnaissance aircraft are employed in the Northern and Pacific fleets
only. Backfire strike aircraft are deployed to the Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific fleets.
The land-based SU-17 Fitter-C ground attack regiments are assigned to the Baltic and
Pacific fleets and are probably intended to support amphibious landings and attack
small, high speed naval craft. The Kiev class aircraft carriers assigned to the Northern,
Black Sea, and Pacific fleets employ Yak-38 Forger VSTOL aircraft and Hormone and
Helix helicopters.
SNA is primarily a land-based force. It is supplemented by aircraft from the state's
other air forces; in particular, bombers from Long-Range Aviation, which is the strategic
air arm of the Soviet Air Forces. Bombers assigned to Long-Range Aivation include
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Note: Totals are rounded
Figure 7. Strength of Soviet Naval Aviation (1987)
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and shorter-range Fencer attack aircraft. All aircraft are capable of carrying both nu-
clear and conventional weapons. [Ref. 36 : p. 63] The SNA land-based force is bolstered
by organic naval air power such as Vertical Short Take-Off and Landing (VSTOL) air-
craft and helicopters onboard ships. [Ref. 41 : p. 114]
The SNA has three principal missions: reconnaissance and maritime surveillance,
antiship strike, and antisubmarine warfare. About ISO aircraft, including TU-16
Badgers, TU-95 Bear Ds, TU-22 Blinders and shorter-range aircraft for coastal patrols,
are used for reconnaissance and maritime surveillance. The Badger is a turbojet-powered
medium bomber that serves a variety of missions such as photographic and electronic
reconnaissance, and electronic countermeasures (ECM). Range is 4,000 miles. Combat
radius is 1,920 miles. The Bear D has four turboprop engines turning contra-rotating
propellers and is equipped for in-flight refueling. Its unrefueled maximum range is 9,000
miles. The Blinder is a supersonic bomber with an estimated range of 4,000 miles at
subsonic speed.
The antiship strike role was originally developed in the 1950s to counter the threat
of American aircraft carriers. It is handled by about 350 aircraft comprised of
BadgcrC/G aircraft equipped with air-to-surface missiles and TU-22M Backfire bombers.
The Backfires pose a serious threat; they are long-range (unrefueled range approx. 2.500
miles), high performance bombers that can be used to deploy against surface warships
as well as merchant and logistic shipping. [Ref. 41 : pp. 115-116] The Backfire is re-
placing the older Badger as the Soviet Navy's main antiship strike aircraft. [Ref. 48 : p.
35]
Submarine hunting is conducted by over 400 aircraft; the primary aircraft are the
IL-38 May, the TU -95 Bear F, the BE- 12 Mail flying boat, Hormone A and Helix hel-
icopters and VSTOL aircraft onboard ships. The IL-38 May resembles the U.S P-3
Orion patrol aircraft in appearance and missions. The turboprop Bear F has sophisti-
cated sensors that enable the Soviets to improve their ASW searches in the areas of
range and quality. It can attack with a large payload of homing torpedoes and depth
bombs. The ship-based Helix helicopter is the successor to the KA-25 Hormone and
has a greater range, speed, and weapon payload. [Ref. 33 : p. 88] Maximum endurance
is four and a half hours.
G. MAIN SURFACE COMBATANTS
Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet Navy has demonstrated a strong commitment to
larger warships with heavier firepower and greater electronics capabilities. These ships
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can deploy to farther distances, carry more ordnance, and execute a more considerable
range of missions and operations than their predecessors. [Ref. 33 : p. 85] At-sea time
of Soviet ships is not comparable to U.S. Navy deployments; about 15 per cent of the
Soviet Navy's ships are deployed at any given time. Yet, it should be stressed that the
Soviets believe in maintaining a high inport readiness condition with the ability to deploy
large numbers of ships during a crisis or conflict. [Ref. 36 : p. 2] Figure 8 on page 53
depicts the Soviet surface combatant forces as of January 1987. [Ref. 45 : p. 1383]
The first Soviet nuclear carrier, approximately 70,000 tons and 1,000 feet long, was
launched in December 1985. The carrier is expected to commence sea trials in
1988-1989, and should be operational by 1990-1991. The building schedule could
produce three such carriers by the late 1990s. [Ref. 36 : p. 164]
The final flight-deck configuration is not yet confirmed; "ski-ramps" may be used
initally for VSTOL or CTOL aircraft. Catapults are expected to be fitted at a later date.
The aircraft for the air wing is still being developed. It is estimated that 60-75 fixed-wing
aircraft will be based on the carrier and all will be stowed in hangars. The Saki naval
airfield near the Black Sea provides an active test and evaluation program with a flight
deck mock-up. The SU-27 Flanker and the MIG-29 Fulcrum, air-intercept fighters as-
signed to the Soviet Air Forces, have been associated with the test facility. It will take
a number of years for the aircraft carrier and the eventual airwing to reach a level of
operational effectiveness. When that level is reached, the Soviet Navy will be able to
extend more dynamic operations beyond the coverage of land-based aviation. [Ref. 33 :
p. 86]
The largest combatant ship currently operational in the Soviet Navy is the Kiev
class aircraft carrier, of which there are four units. The Kiev enhances the Navy's ability
to conduct ASW, reconnaissance, surface strike and air defense missions by employing
12-13 Forger VSTOL aircraft and 14-17 Hormone and Helix helicopters. [Ref. 43 : p. 27]
Yak-38 Forgers, vertical takeoff fighters, certainly do not pose a formidable threat as an
airwing component of the carrier. Fuel consumption during takeoff and landing allows
the Forger approximately 16 minutes of flying time. [Ref. 41 : p. 251] This "all-purpose"
carrier also carries an extensive missile arsenal which includes SS-N-12 Sandbox antiship
cruise missiles with a 300 nautical mile range. [Ref. 41 : p. 105]
In the early 1980s, the USSR began its series production of their most technolog-
ically advanced classes of surface combatants; the Kirov guided-missile cruiser, the
Sovremennyy and Udaloy guided-missile destroyers, and the Slava guided-missile cruiser.
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Surface Baltic Northern Black Caspian Pacific Total
Warships Fleet Sea Sea
Aircraft carriers 1 1 2 4
Helicopter carriers - - 2 - - 2
Guided missile
cruisers 2 9 6 - 12 29
Cruisers 2 2 2 - 3 9
Guided missile
destroyers 10 17 12 - 9 48
Guided missile
frigates 6 8 7 - 11 32
Guided missile
corvettes 13 10 10 - 13 46
Guided missile fast
patrol boats 32 12 20 4 34 102
Destroyers 4 2 7 - 20
Frigates 24 41 41 4 44 154
Corvettes 32 30 15 4 59 140
Anti-sub vessels 71 - 38 16 43 168
Torpedo fast
patrol boats 7 - - 3 - 10
TOTAL 203 132 161 31 237 764
Figure 8. Strength of Soviet Surface Combatant Forces (January 1987)
The Kirov is the first nuclear surface warship built by the Soviet Union and is the largest
warship in the Soviet Navy, with the exception of aircraft and helicopter carriers. The
Kirov is a multi-purpose cruiser that can handle submarine, surface and air attacks. The
cruiser can also accompany carriers to supplement their antiair, antisurface, and
antisubmarine capabilities. [Ref. 44 : p. 41] It is equipped with 20 supersonic SS-N-19
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antiship cruise missiles, three helicopters (either Hormone or Helix) for ASW and for
over-the-horizon-targeting of SS-N-19 missiles, SS-N-14 ASW missiles (rocket-propelled
homing torpedo warhead with an effective range of four nautical miles), and air defense
weapons with anti-cruise missile capabilities that include short-range SA-N-9 missiles
used as defense against incoming missiles, and the longer-range SA-N-6 missiles. [Ref.
33 : p. 86]
The Sovremennyy guided-missile destroyer is a specialized surface combatant, de-
signed primarily for antisurface warfare. It also has a significant arsenal of antiair ca-
pabilities, but minimal ASW armament. The Sovremennyy carries eight SS-N-22 60
nautical mile range antiship cruise missiles and two twin 130mm gunmounts, the largest
guns installed on Soviet destroyers. The Sovremennyy also employs a Helix or Hormone
helicopter and 40 short-range surface-to-air SA-N-7 missiles that can engage targets up
to 46,000 feet. [Ref. 36 : p. 200] The L'daloy guided-missile destroyer is also a specialized
surface combatant but its role is antisubmarine warfare. Its main armament consists of
ASW SS-X-14 missiles and the capability to embark two Helix helicopters. The L'daloy
also carries SA-N-9 missiles for air defense. [Ref. 43 : p. 27]
The gas-turbine powered Slava guided-missile cruiser is configured primarily for an
antiship function. It is armed with SS-N-12 long-range supersonic cruise missiles that
have a range of 300 nautical miles, the SA-N-6 SAM system and a variety of self-defense
weapons such as two 130mm gun batteries. [Ref. 43 : p. 27]
H. AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
The amphibious forces of the Soviet Union consist of two Ivan Rogov class landing
platform dock (LPD) ships, 33 tank landing ships (LST), 55 medium landing ships
(LSM), 71 air cushion landing craft, about 100 conventional landing craft, and a Soviet
Naval Infantry of 16,000 strong amphibious assault forces (marines) equipped with
tanks, armored personnel carriers and rocket launchers. Development of these forces
are to provide the capability for local amphibious operations in support of ground forces
and possible seizure of islands, naval bases, ports and straits. [Ref. 41 : p. il8]
The two Ivan Rogov class LPDs are the largest amphibious ships built by the Soviet
Navy. Each ship is capable of embarking an entire Naval Infantry battalion (about 400
personnel) and its vehicles and equipment, including ten light or medium tanks and 30
armored presonnel carriers. The LPD has two landing decks (forward and aft of the
superstructure) and the helicopter hangar can accommodate four Hormone C variants.
The floating dock well can hold three air cushion landing craft. Armament includes four
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Gatling guns, a barrage rocket launcher, and 20 SA-N-4 surface-to-air missiles with an
eight nautical mile range for point defense. [Ref. 36 : pp. 258-259]
The Soviet Navy has designed and built about 70 air cushion vehicles of varying
sizes, speeds, and capacities to be utilized as landing craft. The Aist class, the largest
air cushion vehicles in the world, can travel 350 nautical miles at 45 knots while earning
as many as 150 troops, or instead of troops, two heavy tanks or four light tanks. They
can accommodate easy movement from sea to land or vice versa, and have been reported
able to continue operating in wave heights often to 12 feet. These craft, however, can
not be transported by Ivan Rogov class LPDs. [Ref. 44 : p. 79]
The main task of the Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI) is to act as an initial assault force,
to be followed by later-arriving Army divisions. Other missions include holding captured
beachheads against counterattack, river crossings, and defense of naval bases. [Ref. 43 :
p. 50] The Northern, Black Sea, and Baltic Fleets are each assigned an SNI regiment
consisting of three infantry and one tank battalions. The Pacific Fleet has two regiments
assigned to it. [Ref. 44 : p. 80] Amphibious lift of the SNI is primarily provided by the
two Ivan Rogov class LPDs. Once infantry troops have landed on a hostile coast, they
must be rapidly resupplied and reinforced on a continuous basis. Air cover and effective
naval gunfire support may be required to land and supply troops. Until the Soviet Navy
has a substantial force of carriers with suitable aircraft embarked, air cover and support
can only be offerred within range of their own air bases. [Ref. 44 : p. 81]
I. NAVAL MINE WARFARE FORCES
Western attention on the Soviet Navy usually focuses on submarines and missiles.
However, it is important to note that the Soviet Navy claims the largest mine warfare
forces in the world. They possess an extemely large stockpile of mines, great minelaying
capabilities, and a mine countermeasures ability that is incomparable to any other na-
tion. Most of the mine warfare fleet is composed of coastal vessels and craft. The Soviet
Navy places great emphasis on the functions of offensive mine warfare; closing of enemy
ports and harbors, blocking of shipping lanes, isolation of naval operationg areas, and
denial of choke point transit routes or operating areas to enemy missile submarines.
[Ref. 33 : p. 88]
Soviet mine stockpiles include roughly 100,000 moored contact mines and at least
200,000 magnetic and acoustic magnet induction mines. The Soviets only have three
dedicated minelayers; the 3,500 ton Alesha class. However, several surface combatants,
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bombers and maritime patrol craft, and essentially all combat submarines can lay mines
and practice to do so regularly. [Ref. 33 : p. 88]
Mine countermeasure vessels and craft (mine hunters and minesweepers) number
over 300. There are three types of operations: mine reconnaissance and search,
minesweeping, and mine hunting. Special sonar and radar dectection gear, explosive
devices, and mechanical and remote sweeping apparatus are standard equipment for
search and minesweeping. Mine hunters employ mine hunting sonar and special diving
teams that defuze and recover, if possible, swept mines. All mine countermeasures ves-
sels have a secondary minelaying mision. [Ref. 44 : p. 108] Figure 9 on page 57 shows
the strength of Soviet mine vessels. [Ref. 45 : p. 1383]
J. FUTURE TRENDS
Until 1955, Soviet naval power reached only to the coastal regions of the country.
Since then, fleet size, composition, effectiveness and military naval objectives have ex-
tended Soviet naval operations well out to sea to accomplish its broad range of tactical
and strategic missions. Numbers alone relect a significant capability to project sea
power. In its pursuit of executing its primary mission of defending the USSR, the Soviet
Navy will probably continue extending its theater borders. This can be achieved by
acquiring more overseas bases to operate additional permanent forward naval forces.
Regions of strategic importance would be the Mediterranean, the Arabian Seas, and the
South Pacific. [Ref. 38 : p. 34] The Soviets have already established strategic overseas
bases at Cam Ranh Bay, Syria, Ethiopia and Cuba. At a time when many American
overseas bases are existing on shaky terms, expansion of Soviet overseas bases could
have serious implications. However, reasons for "anti-American base" sentiment in for-
eign countries may also deny the Soviets a chance to institute new bases.
Long-range, terrain following, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) have quickly
attained dangerous significance in naval warfare. Cruise missiles give the Soviet Navy
another important mission; fleet against shore. All naval attacks using SLCM will con-
tribute to the outcome of a war on land. This fact becomes crucial to continued naval
developments when taken into consideration with a society that has identified its security
interests with events and occurrences on the Eurasian continent and not with the oceans.
[Ref. 49 : p. 106] The potential power of this weapon in accuracy, firing range, and
agility will not cause the USSR's maritime frontiers to recede; rather they will expand,
particularly in polar regions. [Ref. 38 : p. 34]
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Mine/Counter Baltic Northern Black Caspian Pacific Total
Mine Ships Fleet Sea Sea
Major landing
ships - - - - 2 2
Landing ships
(medium) 19 13 12 14 19 77
Landing ships
(small) 30 6 19 12 30 97
TOTAL 49 19 31 26 51 176
Figure 9. Strength of Soviet Mine Warfare Force (January 1987)
It can be expected that the Soviet Navy will continue allocation of resources to
ballistic missile submarines and ASW platforms to protect the SSBXs. The Soviets will
strive for progress in the areas of greater speed, quietness, and sensoring devices that are
quality comparable or better than U.S. submarines. [Ref. 40 : p. 97] Surface combatants,
however, represent the fragile link of Soviet ship construction. Military focus is on
strategic submarines and the land battle. The Navy is not the primary projection force;
Soviet land-oriented leadership acknowledges naval contributions to force projection in
a multi-service role. The Navy will continue with resources for construction of power
projection combatants. Yet, if non-naval defensive interests increase, surface combatant
shipbuilding will falter in deference to those interests. [Ref. 44 : p. 128] Those interests
could be the present Soviet economy. The Politburo is trying to revitailize an ailing
economy which may require substantial capital investment increases for basic industries.
Military expenditures could be severely affected. [Ref. 49 : p. 109]
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K. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The Soviet naval forces described in this chapter represent a multitude of capabilities
that pose a viable and formidable threat to the Blue force commander. Regarding total
numbers of ships, submarines, and aircraft, the Soviet Union has far more hardware than
the U.S. However, the greater number of forces does not necessarily decide the outcome
of the battle. Tactics, weapons and communications technology, and command play a
major role in combat. Besides, in a major naval conflict, it is highly probable that the
Soviet Union will be facing forces from the United States and its allies, thus "reducing"
the threatening size of Soviet fleets.
The Blue force naval commander must worry more about Soviet attack, ballistic,
and cruise-missile submarines. Total Soviet submarines outnumber U.S. submarines
almost three to one. The Soviets may have lagged behind in submarine quieting tech-
nology in the past. However, the Soviets are reportedly producing quieter subs that may
give the U.S ASW forces a more perplexing and difficult hunter mission. Soviet im-
provements in hull design and faster speeds coupled with the fact that the Soviets have
over 2S0 attack and cruise-missile submarines divided between the fleets, could make the
Soviet anti-ship mission fatal to the enemy carrier battle group. Under-ice operations
have become a significant Soviet tactic. Deployment of the SS-N-21 land attack cruise
missile and the reconfiguration of submarines to hold the SS-N-24 cruise missile dem-
onstrates the Soviet Navy's determination to keep the strength and capabilities of their
submarines "on the cutting edge".
Soviet Naval Aviation is the second most important component of the Soviet Navy.
Primarily a land-based force, its strength lies in strike/bomber aircraft. Significance has
been placed on overseas naval operations and is reflected in the installation of overseas
bases and the possible development of a naval air wing that will not need land support
for nuclear powered carrier operations.
The Blue commander and his forces should be familiar with Soviet hardware and
capabilities. To be as effective as possible in combat, one must be aware of the enemy's
forces, the weapon threat, and how those forces and weapons can be used against one's
own naval C3 structure. This knowledge will be used in the Blue commander's decision
making process as he determines the viable courses of action that are available to him
to execute his mission. As stated previously, tactics also plays a major role in the out-
come of battle. The Blue force commander must ensure that his battle force can apply
the most effective tactics to a situation of conflict. To achieve this goal, his battle force
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must practice tactics against Soviet submarines, surface vessels and aircraft. Unfortu-
nately, this strategy is not always feasible or wise. Thus, the Blue force commander must
involve his forces and staff in underway naval tactical exercises as well as use of auto-
mated wargames and trainers. Automated wargames and trainers allow the Blue force
commander and his staff to exercise making tactical decisions against enemy force ca-
pabilities during conflict scenarios. The number of different scenarios are limited by past
combat experiences, human imagination, and system parameters. This decision-making
tool can not provide every battle scenario possible; it does not prepare one for ex-
ceptions and anomalies in battle. Yet, wargames and trainers familiarize the Blue force
commander with Soviet hardware capabilities, effectiveness, and drawbacks, as well as
making him aware of own force strengths and weaknesses. It also allows him to learn
from his mistakes, which may not be possible in war.
59
V. RED NAVAL C3 SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Red naval C3 system is integrated into the large and powerful Soviet
fleet. Soviet naval C3 is based on requirements of survivability, reliability, diversity, re-
dundancy and effectiveness. [Ref. 32 : p. 17] To meet these requirements, Soviet C3 has
become highly automated. The automation has been designed specifically to meet mili-
tary requirments, making it much more effective than reconfiguring existing systems for
military use. [Ref. 29 : p. 728]
A C3 system consists of command posts or control organs, forces and weapons,
sensors that collect intelligence, and an interconnecting communication network. The
C3 system is limited by the level of technology available to the system designer. Tech-
nology can increase the capabilities of sensor and weapon systems, as well as commu-
nications and computers. [Ref. 50 : p. 112]
Soviet command posts, communications, and intelligence methods will be examined
in the following sections. Major forces and their weapons have been discussed in
Chapter Four and will not be analyzed below. Conclusions to the chapter will attempt
to summarize how the Blue force commander can use this knowledge to more effectively
use his own C3 naval system.
B. COMMAND POSTS
The establishment of the principle or main naval command post and separately lo-
cated subordinate, alternate, and reserve command posts, as well as varied communi-
cations resources connecting the command posts with other nodes in the C3 system,
provides the redundancy of the Soviet naval C3 system. System survivability is increased
through redundancy and hardening and concealment of the command posts. The main
command post of the Soviet Red naval C3 system is thought to be near Moscow. [Ref.
29 : p. 728]
A flagman command post (FKP) and a fleet or flotilla command post (KPF) control
naval surface forces. The KPF is a specially equipped and hardened headquarters on
shore where the commander and the staff of the fleet or flotilla direct subordinate forces
in an operation or exercise at sea. The operational control of Soviet afloat submarines
belongs to the respective command post ashore. However, unlike the case of surface
forces, tactical command and control decisions are made by the on-scene senior subma-
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rine tactical group commander. (Soviet submarines usually travel in pairs or groups of
two or more subs of the same or varied class carrying out a specific mission.) [Ref. 51 :
p. 69]
Command posts receive reconnaissance data from various sources ashore, at sea and
in the air regarding a target's location, composition and movement and transmits this
information to the force commander or senior commander of the tactical group at sea.
The command post is also responsible for selecting the engagement or strike time and
location and vectoring the tactical group so they can gain initial target contact with their
own sensor devices. [Ref. 51 : p. 70] Thus, the command post is designed to provide the
fleet commander situated at the post with near real-time intelligence data and commu-
nications and the ability to coordinate and interoperate different forces and their weapon
systems from one central point.
In an American battlegroup, the carrier represents relative independence of oper-
ations; the Officer in Tactical Command or OTC runs the command and cotrol problem.
For the Soviets, the OTC is not at sea; he is located at a land-based command post re-
lying on national sensor systems for surveillance information. The Soviet Navy's first
nuclear carrier will enable them to form a battlegroup that can sustain air defense or
airborne ASW operations for an extended period of time, without the aid of land-based
aircraft or land-based facilities. Perhaps, an independent battle group can have some
type of effect on the strong, centralized control of Soviet naval operations so that intense
carrier combat decisions can be made by the senior seagoing officer, and not made
thousands of miles away in a bunker. [Ref. 44 : pp. 22-26] Yet, centralization is so em-
bedded in the Soviet political, military, and economic arenas that initiative of a carrier
commander will probably be limited, if allowed, and the continuous series of decisions
that must be made for successful carrier operations will be made from the land-based
command post.
C. COMMUNICATIONS
Fast, reliable and secure communications is the most significant element of a naval
C3 svstem. Without an interconnecting communications network, the commander will
not be able to transmit actions to his subordinate forces in an efficient and expeditious
manner. The Soviet Navy uses a comprehensive network of cable and open-wire lines
and radio relay links to provide communications between the main and secondary naval
command posts ashore. An extensive, redundant communications system also exists
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between naval command posts ashore and forces afloat, which include submarines, sur-
face ships and aircraft at sea. [Ref. 51 : p. 65]
The principal means of communication between shore naval command posts and
submarines deployed in forward areas are low frequency (LF) and very low frequency
(VLF) communications. The Soviets operate over 30 VLF land-based stations. The
maximum range of VLF transmissions is approximately 10,000 miles. VLF wave depth
penetration is about 18 feet which means the submarine can stay submerged when re-
ceiving messages. Data rate is probably about 67 words per minute. The early 1980s
demonstated Soviet use of extremely low frequency (ELF) communications to broadcast
to their SSBXs and SSGNs. [Ref. 51 : p. 65] The range of ELF wave transmissions is
about 6200 miles and can penetrate thick ice with minimal degradation, and water up to
360 feet. The submarine uses a towed antenna to receive the signal. However, ELF is
only capable of an extremely slow data rate; three characters takes about 15 minutes,
allowing only very short coded messages to be transmitted. ELF communications are
probably used by the Soviets to notify SSBXs to rise to shallower depths to receive VLF
or LF bands. [Ref. 51 : p. 72] The wavelengths of these frequency band ranges (LF, VLF,
and ELF) emphasize the Soviet Navy's intention to maximize the message's reception
depth vice message data rate. [Ref. 29 : p. 728]
High frequency (HF) radio transmitters are the primary means of commnications
between shore command posts and Soviet surface ships and aircraft. HF is also used
as a backup capability for LF. VLF communications with Soviet submerged submarines.
Soviet HF radio transmitters necessitate that long antennas be exposed above the sur-
face of the water. Soviet submarines can also use buoys equipped with telescopic an-
tennas that transmit in the HF band for emergency communications with surface forces,
aircraft and shore command posts. [Ref. 51 : p. 71] There does not seem to be a Soviet
airborne radio communications system equivalent to the U.S. Take Charge and Move
Out (TACAMO) for communications with submarines. [Ref. 51: p. 65]
The Soviets use radio communications to transmit and receive telephone and tele-
graph data, and also to transmit data to automated systems. "Radio direction" and
"radio net" are the basic methods of communication organization. Radio direction is a
highly reliable and secure method of arranging radio communications between two
command posts. Radio net organizes radio communications between three or more
ashore or afloat command posts. These communications will be less reliable and secure,
and have a lower circuit availability. [Ref. 51 : p. 70]
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Military communications in space are used by the Soviet Navy for long-distance
transmission of messages. Wartime roles for communications satellites could include
relaying messages concerning nuclear weapons, the relaying of targeting data to weapons
platforms and the command and control of military operations. [Ref. 52 : p. 107]
The Molniya series of satellites, first launched in the mid-1960s, provides eight hours
of continuous contact with the Soviet mainland. [Ref. 51 : p. 72] The Molniya commu-
nications satellite system can be used to relay messages to submerged submarines. The
Soviets also have satellites in orbit that primarily transmit data between satellites-
namely the Cosmos 1700 series. [Ref. 29 : p. 728]
The Statsionar (Raduga) communications satellite system has been operating since
the mid-1970s. Two Statsionar satellites are placed in a geosynchronous position and
are each able to complete one orbit every 24 hours. Three geostationary satellite com-
munications systems are also under development by the Soviets. They are called the
Volna, Gals and Luch series. [Ref. 51 : p. 72] The Volna series has satellites placed over
the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans and reportedly has the ability for real-time
message relay. [Ref. 29 : p. 729]
The Soviet satellite navigational systems provide accurate position locations for
Soviet submarines, surface combatants and aircraft. They are usually kept in a high
orbit of about 20.000 km to ensure wide coverage. The current navigational system
consists of 12 satellites placed in orbital plans that provide continuous and redundant
coverage of the entire world. A new and improved global satellite system known as
GLONASS is composed of nine to 12 satellites and is reportedly similar to the U.S.
NAVSTAR global positioning system. Some evidence indicates that GLONASS feeds
off signals from NAVSTAR. [Ref. 52 : p. 109]
The Alpha radio navaid system is very similar to the U.S. Omega radio navigation
system. The Alpha has three powerful 500k\V transmitters located in the eastern, west-
ern, and geographic center of the USSR that have the capability to provide world-wide
coverage. The Alpha is used primarily by aircraft and can conceivably be used by sub-
merged Soviet submarines, in particular, SSBNs deployed in the northern waters of the
world. [Ref. 29 : p. 729]
D. INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence provides the information necessary to utilize combat-ready forces in the
most effective manner in fulfilling the objectives of a mission. Good intelligence requires
the highest technological level of operational capability, reliability, clarity and secrecy.
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Soviet strategic intelligence is defined as activities conducted by state agencies which
are directed towards systematic collection in both peacetime and wartime of poli-
tical, military, economic, scientific and technological data concerning perceived en-
emies. [Ref 29 : p. 729]
There are three state agencies that collect intelligence for naval requirements: the
Naval Intelligence organization, the KGB (Committee of State Security), and the GRU
(Chief Directorate of the Intelligence of the Soviet General Staff). The Naval Intelli-
gence organization is comprised of an intelligence directorate of the Main Naval Staff
in Moscow and intelligence directorates for each fleet. Fleet directorates support oper-
ating forces in the fleet area, operate various reconnaissance and collection platforms,
and apprise the Main Naval Staff and the GRU of the results of their intelligence gath-
ering. A fleet intelligence directorate is described by Figure 10 on page 65.
The Naval Intelligence organization uses several diverse types of sensoring devices
to collect, analyze and evaluate naval intelligence. These sensors include ocean surveil-
lance satellites, maritime reconnaissance aircraft, submarine and surface combatants,
specialized intelligence collector ships, merchant ships and fishing trawlers, coastal radar
stations, and seabed acoustic surveillance systems. Together, these sensoring devices are
known as the Soviet Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS)--a term created by Western an-
alysts. SOSS is the principal means of tracking both Soviet and foreign naval forces.
[Ref. 29 : p. 37] Principal naval intelligence targets for the Soviet Union are the enemy's
ASW forces (especially SSNs), its SSBN'SLBM force, aircraft carrier task forces, major
surface combatants, amphibious forces, naval auxiliaries and merchant shipping, and
logistical support systems (including the respective C3 systems of these forces) [Ref. 29
: p. 729] These targets are listed by priority.
Ocean surveillance satellites are controlled by the Soviet Air Defense Forces. The
Soviets first began testing and launching these satellites in the mid-1960s. These satel-
lites are used to monitor enemy fleet movement so they can be targeted by various
anti-ship weapons. [Ref. 52 : p. 109]
The Soviet Union uses both active and passive ocean surveillance satellites. Active
ocean surveillance satellites, called RORSAT (Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite)
by the West, use active radar to detect ships. The are usually launched in pairs to en-
hance coverage. They travel a 155-175 mile altitude circular orbit at an inclination of
65 degrees. The paired satellites track surface vessels and are thought to provide a
stereo-imaging effect that enhances the analysis of distinguishing specific ships sighted.
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Figure 10. Fleet Intelligence Directorate
The RORSAT is equipped with a nuclear-powered radar that has a scanning width of
400-500 km. It has an approximated useful lifespan of 60-80 days. It has the capability
of Fixing individual ship coordinates and providing accurate targeting data a few
momemts later. However, operation can be inconsistent since adverse weather condi-
tions restrict radar observations. [Ref. 29 : p. 730]
ELINT (electronic intercept) ocean surveillance satellites are passive signal-
gathering systems that "gather" electronic signals from Western ships' radars, HF com-
munications, and other electronic sensors to obtain their location coordinates and
possibly, information on the type of ship. The orbital period of an ELINT satellite is
93.3 minutes and many satellites have to be used to obtain full coverage of the ocean's
surface. [Ref. 29 : p. 730] The Soviets have used both passive and active surveillance
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satellites to monitor and collect intelligence during Iranian, Afghanistan, Falkland Is-
lands, and Lebanon conflicts. [Ref. 43 : p. 55]
Photographic satellites have also been sent into orbit. These satellites can eject ex-
posed film packets when passing over the Soviet Union. [Ref. 36 : p. 39]
The Soviets also possess the low earth orbit (LEO) MIR space station complex
which provides many military applications as well as opportunities for testing new sur-
veillance techniques. The MIR space station can provide optical or infra-red surveil-
lance. [Ref. 53 : p. 45]
Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) collects intelligence mainly from its inventory of
TU-95 Bear D long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft, Badger aircraft, and IL-38
May ASW aircraft. Approximately 45 Bear D aircraft are divided between the Northern
and Pacific fleets. Bear Ds conduct radar and Elint reconnaissance missions and can
transmit radarscope data through a video data link to platforms capable of launching
missiles. Badger D'E aircraft are used for photographic and electronic reconnaissance.
They can be identified by camera ports or electronic pods under their wings and elec-
tronic domes on their fuselage. Badger H/J aircraft are employed in the electronic
countermeasures role. This role consists of accompanying strike aircraft in close for-
mation, and standing off from ships being attacked to jam enemy defensive radars. [Ref.
36 : p. 61]
Northern Fleet Bear Ds conduct Central and South Atlantic reconnaissance
missions from airbases in Cuba and Angola. The North Atlantic is patrolled by TU-95s
based on the Kola Peninsula. Pacific Fleet Bear Ds conduct reconnaissance missions
over the Sea of Japan and a major part of the North Central Pacific from airbases in
Vladivostok, Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinsky, Alekseyevka, and Petropavlosk. The airbases
at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, Vietnam deploy Bear Ds over the South China Sea and
the West Pacific. Aircraft intelligence gathering in the Indian Ocean consists of IL-38
May deployments from Asmara, Ethiopia to provide reconnaissance flights over the Red
Sea and the Gulf of Aden/Arabian Sea, and Bear D deployments from bases in the
southern part of the USSR. [Ref. 29 : p. 730-731]
The Soviet Navy routinely uses surface combatants and submarines to gather data
on the locations and movements of Western naval vessels and merchant ships. The
Soviets also use their large merchant fleet, numerous fishing trawlers and oceanographic
research and hydrographic survey vessels to collect intelligence against targets of op-
portunity. [Ref. 29 : p. 731] Passive intelligence gathering ships known as intelligence
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collectors and designated AGIs are primarily used for monitoring the deployments of
Western SSBNs, surface combatants and merchant vessels, aiding Soviet SSNs by vec-
toring them to follow Western SSBX trails, recording acoustic signatures of Western
SSBNs, and collecting ELINT data. [Ref. 29 : p. 731] Soviet AGIs regularly operate off
U.S. missile submarine bases at Holy Lock, Scotland, Kings Bay, Georgia, Charleston.
South Carolina, and Bangor, Washington. AGIs can also be found routinely patrolling
the U.S. west coast off Point Mugu or San Diego, Hawaii, in the Korea Strait, the South
China Sea, and in the Indian Ocean monitoring traffic passing through the Strait of
Hormuz. These ships regularly trail U.S. and NATO naval forces during exercises and
keep watch off any areas of current military and maritime activity. [Ref. 43 : p. 54]
Soviet AGIs number over 60 vessels and are easily identified by their electronic an-
tennas. The newest and largest AGIs, the Balzam class, have built-in data processing
and analysis capability. They are also the only AGI class built with defensive guns and
missiles. [Ref. 36 : p. 326]
All access ways to the 28,000 miles of Soviet coastline are protected by a chain of
radio intercept stations. These stations are controlled and operated by Soviet Navy
coastal defense units. The radio stations intercept transmissions from surface ships and
submarines and locate their positions through triangulation. [Ref. 36 : p. 38]
The Soviets have laid two fixed seabed acoustic surveillance systems. One barrier
extends from the North Cape to the southern end of the Svalbards to protect Soviet
submarine refuges and operating areas in the Barents Sea. The second barrier extends
eastwards off the Kuril Island Archipelago to protect the Sea of Okhotsk. These seabed
systems are similar to the U.S. Seafloor Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) and are
used to track Soviet and foreign naval vessels. It is reported that these barriers can de-
tect a submerged submarine at a range of 100 miles. Soviet submarines also drop bot-
tom anchored passive acoustic surveillance buoys in various regions of the oceans to
gather intelligence. [Ref. 29 : p. 732]
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The Blue commander must ensure that he understands the functioning of the Soviet
Red naval C3 system. This system controls Soviet forces and provides the Soviet
commander the ability to assess a combat situation, select his course of action and
transmit his decisions as orders to subordinate forces. The Blue commander who is
aware of Red C3 system characteristics and background can tactically neutralize its
strengths while exploiting its weaknesses.
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The Soviet Red naval C3 system is diversified, reliable, redundant and effective.
Survivability of the C3 system is strengthened by redundancy. However, it is expected
during a protracted war that communications and intelligence capabilities will be dis-
rupted. Soviet dependence on satellites for long-distance communications and surveil-
lance will be denied if the satellites are destroyed or overpowered by electronic counter
measures. Also, in war, intelligence gathering platforms such as AGIs, fishing trawlers
and merchant vessels will not be able to obtain the easy access to Western coastlines and
relatively uninhibited patrolling of Western naval force activity that they are allowed in
peacetime.
The effectiveness of the Soviet Red naval C3 system is highly reliant on the level of
control and type of management used on its forces and firepower. Command posts
provide naval forces with the tight, centralized control and management typical in the
Soviet military. These command posts are hardened and redundant and their links with
at-sea commands are reliable and secure. Command posts are designed to provide the
commander (located at the command post) with detailed control of the engagement or
battle from one focal point. However, this rigid structure may, in an engagement, battle
or protracted war, overwhelm the commander. The amount of incoming data that must
be analyzed and correlated could overload the communications system as well as the
commander himself. Probable resultants of this overload would be a decrease of reliable
and secure communications and a slower response time from the commander as he tries
to sort out the information to use in his decision making process. Technology used to
produce an effective focal point, such as automated computer systems, can reduce the
time needed for the decisions making process, but could become so complex that sofware
or hardware problems could be inherent to the command post. The commander or his
staff must also possess more specialized skills to use this equipment.
Another possible problem with this rigid structure is the fact that the Soviets prac-
tice naval exercises with the described naval C3 system. Afloat commanders are exposed
to constant deferment of tactical decisions to the command post comnrnder. Thus,
on-scene initiative and flexible response to changing situations may suffer drastically or
be nonexistent. Morale of afloat commanders could also suffer since they play no part
in the tactical planning of a battle or engagement. Furthermore, the command post
commander is so accustomed to "calling the shots" that if a situation arose that tactical
decisions could be better handled by the on-scene commander, the command post
commander may not trust the abilites of that afloat commander. The only way a com-
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mand post commander can be aware of and be willing to depend on a afloat
commander's abilities is for the command post commander to either personally interact
with the afloat commander or have favorable impressions of the afloat commander from
past interactions with other or former command post commanders. The author of this
thesis has been unable to find any evidence of such interaction.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter will present a brief overview of the concepts, theories and systems that
were discussed in previous chapters. Recommendations will be provided as to how the
Blue force commander can use this knowledge to enhance the effectiveness of the Blue
naval C3 system.
A. SUMMARY
Combat is an uncertain process for both sides. Neither side is completely sure of
his opponent's next move, especially since the opponent is trying to conceal his actions
or plans. Information on an opponent's forces and movements can be collected and
analyzed. This information can often be fragmentary or contradictory and the oppo-
nent's intentions will continue to have a function of randomness. The Blue force
commander must be able to assess the situation and determine the capabilities of his
opponent's forces and means. The more the Blue force commander understands his
opponent, the more he can affect the battle outcome. To understand his opponent, the
Blue force commander must familiarize himself with the concept of control which per-
vades the Soviet military system.
Control is vital to the economic, political and military aspects of the Soviet state.
The driving principles behind control include Marxist-Leninist theory, Soviet military
thought, the effects of past wars and the revolution in military affairs, cybernetics, and
context. An understanding of these principles will assist in shaping a perception of the
Soviet commander's mindset.
Marxist-Leninist teachings provide justification for war as an ever-advancing strug-
gle toward final conflict with imperialist ideologies, and prove that all wars involving the
Soviet state are just, progressive wars aimed at protecting the socialist states and liber-
ating peoples from national and class oppression. Soviet military thought promotes the
concept of maintaining a powerful defensive strength and a high level of combat read-
iness to guard against possible imperialist aggression. Victory depends on the quantity
and the quality of forces and equipment. Thus, the Soviets place great emphasis on
preparation for war by supporting a large force structure. Military' science answers
questions on armed warfare and teaches the Red comander, through theory and practice,
the art of war. Lessons learned from the Great Patriotic War instill remembrance of the
sacrifices and destruction wrought against the Soviet people and infuse patriotism as well
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as vindication of enormous military expenditures. Cybernetics has given the Red
commander the tools to control his forces and equipment. Control is not a new concept
to him. Control is part of his lifestyle, emanating from the heights of Communist Party
leadership.
Soviet Naval Force Control is the process that the Soviets use to create and main-
tain combat readiness and fighting efficiency, and control naval forces during execution
of an assigned mission. Its fundamental purpose is to ensure subordinate forces are used
with maximum effectiveness when carrying out their mission. The complexities of
modern warfare, especially the sharp reduction in time for the decision making process,
makes it imperative that forces possess the highest combat readiness attainable and that
there be the most comprehensive preparation of combat operations permissable under
the circumstances. Victories in combat can hinge on the opponent who can collect and
analyze intelligence, assess the situation, develop the best course of action and execute
that action in the shortest period of time possible. To enhance the quickened pace of
decision making, the Soviet Navy has employed the use of automated systems, partic-
ularly ASUVs. ASUVs manage combat data at a much greater rate than humanly pos-
sible. ASUVs also provide canned responses to various combat situations for the
purpose of promoting more efficient and effective decision making by the commander.
However, ASUVs may stifle initative by training the commander to choose a canned
response vice thinking for himself. This may become evident when a seldom occurring
or new combat situation arises for which there are no appropriate canned responses.
Centralization of forces allows the use of resources to be flexible and meet diverse
requirements. It is especially important and used rigidly by higher echelon commanders
when operational plans involve the use or coordination of highly destructive weapons,
such as nuclear weapons or missiles. Decentralization of control is also important under
appropriate conditions. Quickly changing, offensive operations in the naval arena may
demand increased initiative on the part of unit and/or ship commanders. Of course, in
the Soviet Navy, initiative carrys a price tag; the commander is held personally respon-
sible for his actions, the actions of his subordinate forces, and the accomplishment of the
mission. He is supposed to act within the goals of the Communist Party and his military
superiors. Penalties for deviations could be severe enough to quelch ideas of initiative
when the situation needs it and enforce following the operational plan. Also, decen-
tralization is not a concept that is allowed frequently by the high command ashore
controlling the commander at sea. This infrequency in transferring control of operations
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to the afloat commander could make him indecisive, unwilling to use initiative and tend
to adhere to the course of action selected by the ASUV.
In the past 15 years, the Soviet Navy has grown from a coastal defense power to a
capable and formidable sea power that can amply support the political, economic and
military objectives of the state. Soviet naval interests are directed toward building larger,
heavier armed ships with greater endurance. The launching of the 70,000 ton nuclear
powered carrier and the introduction of nine classes of submarines are prime examples
of the Soviet Navy's determination to continue its naval buildup, a buildup that includes
naval aviation, mine warfare vessels and other components of the Soviet Navy. The
nuclear powered carrier also represents the Soviet Navy's efforts to extend battle group
operations and sustain air defense or airborne ASW operations without the assistance
of land-based aircraft or land-based facilities.
The present Soviet fleet is large and capable. However, large numbers of craft and
deadly weapon systems do not, alone, represent the effectiveness of the Soviet Navy.
They are one component of the Soviet naval C3 system. The other components are the
naval command posts, intelligence sensors, and an interconnecting communications
network.
Command posts provide the leadership and direction for the naval force structure.
The type of leadership and direction chosen by the Soviet military, in most cases, is one
of centralized control. In a tactical situation, the high command ashore collects and
analyzes the data, selects the best course of action based on the analysis, and commu-
nicates his decision to the afloat commander. To assess the situation correctly, the Red
commander must receive accurate intelligence. Intelligence sensors are varied but
heavily dependent on satellites and intelligence collector platforms. The interconnecting
communications network provides the fast, reliable and secure communications links
that are the most significant element in any C3 system. In combat, especially a pro-
tracted war, intelligence sensors and communications networks will be affected and de-
graded; the extent of degradation encountered is subject to the situation circumstances.
Nevertheless, the Red naval C3 system must be able to effectively continue its operations
in a degraded mode.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The concepts examined in the previous chapters and summarized above provide in-
sight into the Soviet approach to the C3 process and how it affects Soviet actions. This
insight is essential to the Blue commander in a combat environment, where his know-
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ledge of enemy forces and capabilities could affect battle outcome. Knowing the number
and location of enemy forces and the range and firepower of their weapon systems may
not be enough information for the Blue commander to formulate the best and most ef-
fective course of action for his C3 system. It may be important to know that in a tactical
situation at sea, courses of action are frequently made by the Soviet high command
ashore and communicated to the Red afloat commander. It may be important to know
that Red commanders are highly educated in Soviet military science and the Soviet art
and war, and that their actions are based on those principles. It may also be important
to know what intelligence sensors the Soviet Navy relies on to collect its information.
So many factors can play a role in the decision making process.
The Blue commander needs a complete picture of his enemy, meaning his mission,
his prcedures, his capabilites, and his mindset. Marxist-Leninist theory, Soviet military
thought, past war experience, and Soviet cybernetics provide insight into the Soviet
mindset. The concept of Soviet Naval Force Control provides the procedures used to
control Soviet forces and systems. Current and accurate information on the Red naval
C3 system provides th mission and capabilities of the Soviet Navy. The Blue
commander who is aware of and conversant with all of these concepts can formulate
more effective decisions for the use and protection of his C3 system because he better
understands his enemy.
The following recommendations can be used and applied to enhance the Blue
commander's decision making process, and thus effect the progress of the Blue force C3
system.
• the indoctrination of key naval tactical decision makers and planners in Soviet
Naval Force Control and the Red naval C3 system;
• the assignment of Soviet experts to staffs;
• better translations of Soviet professional material; and
• heavy exposure to wargames and trainers that simulate the Soviet naval force
structure for naval commanders, their staffs and other designated naval personnel.
Key naval tactical decision makers and planners such as battle group staffs, com-
bined warfare commanders, and tactical action officers, should be educated in Soviet
principles of control and the application of these principles to the Soviet naval C3 sys-
tem. It is imperative that they understand the capabilities of the Red naval C3 system
When one understands an opponent's mindset and force capabilities, one can remove
some of the randomness inherent in the opponent's next action. In other words, some
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of the uncertainty can be eliminated from combat when one can second-guess an oppo-
nent's next course of action. Battle outcome can then be affected by the commander
reacting to or outmaneuvering the opponent. To predict an opponent's next move, the
Blue commander must understand the Soviet mindset and approach to controlling their
naval C3 system. To provide a better decision making process for employing the Blue
naval C3 system, key naval personnel must understand these principles. Education of
key tactical decision makers and planners in Soviet Naval Force Control and the Red
naval C3 system should be included in specified schools such as the Naval War College,
Tactical Training Groups and Department Head School.
Indoctrination of key naval personnel will not make them experts in Sovietology.
The assignment of Soviet experts to staffs will augment the Blue commander's abilities
to perceive his opponent's next course of action. Soviet experts should be highly
knowledgeable in the political, military and economic aspects of the Soviet state. He
could then impart this information, as circumstances dictate, to assist the Blue
commander in analyzing and assessing the situation and selecting the most appropriate
course of action for the situation. The Soviet expert would be an advisor to the Blue
commander on the Soviet naval force structure and capabilities. He would also advise
the Blue commander on probable Soviet courses of action in combat, thus reducing
some of the randomness and uncertainty inherent in decision making.
Inadequate Western translations of Soviet open-literature military writings could
adversely affect the Blue commander's perception of Soviet Naval Force Control. In the
past, Soviet Naval Force Control was translated as being equivalent to the U.S. concept
of Command and Control. However, the concepts are not exactly the same. Naval
Force Control defines a control porcess for managing and regulating the Soviet force
structure to accomplish an assigned mission. Command and Control is a U.S. term that
invokes a more generalized concept of using procedures, organization structure, and
equipment (with heavy emphasis on equipment) to complete the decision making process
necessary to complete an assigned mission. Thus, Soviet Naval Force Control and
Command and Control are two concepts that achieve the same end but use different
approaches.
Other Soviet military concepts have been misunderstood by the West because of
inadequate English translations of Soviet Russian language writing. A stronger en-
deavor must be made to produce qualified Western translator-analysts, who are fluent
in the Russian language and who understand Soviet military concepts. Attention to
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context will yield more accurate and consistent translations, and thus, better compre-
hension of underlying concepts of Soviet Naval Force Control and other Soviet naval
applications.
The Blue commander must be able to practice executing his naval C3 system in or-
der to ascertain the effectiveness of the system during a conflict or war. Practice also
determines the preparation and combat readiness of the system. Battle forces must
practice combat tactics against an opponent's force structure. The most efficient ap-
proach to practicing during peacetime is for the Blue commander to involve his staff and
subordinate forces in actual and simulated naval tactical exercises. Actual exercises are
highly important in conditioning forces. Yet, heavy emphasis should also be placed on
automated wargames and trainers for the Blue commander, his staff, and designated
personnel. To provide effective simulation, there must be a working knowledge of pos-
sible Soviet actions and reactions within the C3 arena. Wargames and trainers famil-
iarize players with the decision making process necessary in conflict that may be
restricted by time or insufficient intelligence, the Soviet force structure, own force
strengths and weaknesses, and the general execution of the Blue naval C3 system during
intensified operations. Of course, automated wargames and trainers are restricted in
application by not having the ability to provide every battle scenario possible; anomalies
and exceptions in battle can not be predicted. However, these decision making tools do
provide practice in executing the naval C3 process and allow testing of Blue force effec-
tiveness against possible Soviet actions as well as Blue force initiatives in combat.
Wargames and trainers also allow the Blue commander to learn from his mistakes, which
may not be possible in an actual conflict.
The effectiveness of the Blue commander's naval C3 system is a function of his
comprehension of own forces (mission, procedures, hardware, etc), the enemy's forces,
and the combat environment. Knowledge of the Red naval C3 system and the Soviet
Naval Force Control process applied to the system will provide the Blue commander
with the ability to better protect his own C3 system from enemy interference and ex-
ploitation, aptitude to better neutralize, degrade, and/ or destroy enemy forces, and un-
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